From 675d4ce25b630cd9132dfe63244f5fc4d6b648c5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Rafal Wojtczuk Date: Wed, 4 May 2011 10:53:43 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 1/8] qrexec_daemon: add explicite sanitize routine It sanitizes messages from agent, the only untrusted input. No new checks have been added, just moved the code. --- qrexec/qrexec_daemon.c | 67 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 54 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/qrexec/qrexec_daemon.c b/qrexec/qrexec_daemon.c index ee964437..67c625c9 100644 --- a/qrexec/qrexec_daemon.c +++ b/qrexec/qrexec_daemon.c @@ -335,11 +335,62 @@ void handle_trigger_exec(int req) exit(1); } +void check_clid_in_range(unsigned int untrusted_clid) +{ + if (untrusted_clid >= MAX_FDS || untrusted_clid < 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "from agent: clid=%d\n", untrusted_clid); + exit(1); + } +} + + +void sanitize_message_from_agent(struct server_header *untrusted_header) +{ + int untrusted_cmd; + switch (untrusted_header->type) { + case MSG_AGENT_TO_SERVER_TRIGGER_EXEC: + untrusted_cmd = untrusted_header->clid; + if (untrusted_cmd != QREXEC_EXECUTE_FILE_COPY && + untrusted_cmd != QREXEC_EXECUTE_FILE_COPY_FOR_DISPVM) { + fprintf(stderr, + "received MSG_AGENT_TO_SERVER_TRIGGER_EXEC cmd %d ?\n", + untrusted_cmd); + exit(1); + } + break; + case MSG_AGENT_TO_SERVER_STDOUT: + case MSG_SERVER_TO_CLIENT_STDERR: + case MSG_AGENT_TO_SERVER_EXIT_CODE: + check_clid_in_range(untrusted_header->clid); + if (untrusted_header->len > MAX_DATA_CHUNK + || untrusted_header->len < 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "agent feeded %d of data bytes?\n", + untrusted_header->len); + exit(1); + } + break; + + case MSG_XOFF: + case MSG_XON: + check_clid_in_range(untrusted_header->clid); + break; + default: + fprintf(stderr, "unknown mesage type %d from agent\n", + untrusted_header->type); + exit(1); + } +} + void handle_agent_data() { struct client_header hdr; - struct server_header s_hdr; - read_all_vchan_ext(&s_hdr, sizeof s_hdr); + struct server_header s_hdr, untrusted_s_hdr; + + read_all_vchan_ext(&untrusted_s_hdr, sizeof untrusted_s_hdr); + /* sanitize start */ + sanitize_message_from_agent(&untrusted_s_hdr); + s_hdr = untrusted_s_hdr; + /* sanitize end */ // fprintf(stderr, "got %x %x %x\n", s_hdr.type, s_hdr.clid, // s_hdr.len); @@ -349,11 +400,6 @@ void handle_agent_data() return; } - if (s_hdr.clid >= MAX_FDS || s_hdr.clid < 0) { - fprintf(stderr, "from agent: clid=%d\n", s_hdr.clid); - exit(1); - } - if (s_hdr.type == MSG_XOFF) { clients[s_hdr.clid].state |= CLIENT_DONT_READ; return; @@ -373,16 +419,11 @@ void handle_agent_data() case MSG_AGENT_TO_SERVER_EXIT_CODE: hdr.type = MSG_SERVER_TO_CLIENT_EXIT_CODE; break; - default: + default: /* cannot happen */ fprintf(stderr, "from agent: type=%d\n", s_hdr.type); exit(1); } hdr.len = s_hdr.len; - if (hdr.len > MAX_DATA_CHUNK) { - fprintf(stderr, "agent feeded %d of data bytes?\n", - hdr.len); - exit(1); - } if (clients[s_hdr.clid].state == CLIENT_INVALID) { // benefit of doubt - maybe client exited earlier char buf[MAX_DATA_CHUNK]; From d68183da0c49157bb19390fbcb02d58f940c6485 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Rafal Wojtczuk Date: Wed, 4 May 2011 12:52:54 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 2/8] qrexec: added comments, made identifiers more verbose --- qrexec/buffer.c | 6 ++ qrexec/glue.h | 4 +- qrexec/qrexec.h | 2 +- qrexec/qrexec_agent.c | 136 ++++++++++++------------- qrexec/qrexec_daemon.c | 226 +++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------- qrexec/write_stdin.c | 23 ++++- 6 files changed, 235 insertions(+), 162 deletions(-) diff --git a/qrexec/buffer.c b/qrexec/buffer.c index be36a039..55f195b3 100644 --- a/qrexec/buffer.c +++ b/qrexec/buffer.c @@ -61,6 +61,12 @@ void buffer_free(struct buffer *b) buffer_init(b); } +/* +The following two functions can be made much more efficient. +Yet the profiling output show they are not significant CPU hogs, so +we keep them so simple to make them obviously correct. +*/ + void buffer_append(struct buffer *b, char *data, int len) { int newsize = len + b->buflen; diff --git a/qrexec/glue.h b/qrexec/glue.h index 60d697ad..67fce180 100644 --- a/qrexec/glue.h +++ b/qrexec/glue.h @@ -41,8 +41,8 @@ enum { WRITE_STDIN_ERROR }; -int flush_client_data(int fd, int clid, struct buffer *buffer); -int write_stdin(int fd, int clid, char *data, int len, +int flush_client_data(int fd, int client_id, struct buffer *buffer); +int write_stdin(int fd, int client_id, char *data, int len, struct buffer *buffer); void set_nonblock(int fd); int fork_and_flush_stdin(int fd, struct buffer *buffer); diff --git a/qrexec/qrexec.h b/qrexec/qrexec.h index ec29ed51..d0769366 100644 --- a/qrexec/qrexec.h +++ b/qrexec/qrexec.h @@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ enum { struct server_header { unsigned int type; - unsigned int clid; + unsigned int client_id; unsigned int len; }; diff --git a/qrexec/qrexec_agent.c b/qrexec/qrexec_agent.c index 24683c71..9e7347fc 100644 --- a/qrexec/qrexec_agent.c +++ b/qrexec/qrexec_agent.c @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ enum fdtype { }; struct _process_fd { - int clid; + int client_id; int type; int is_blocked; }; @@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ void do_exec(char *cmd) exit(1); } -void handle_just_exec(int clid, int len) +void handle_just_exec(int client_id, int len) { char buf[len]; int fdn, pid; @@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ void handle_just_exec(int clid, int len) fprintf(stderr, "executed (nowait) %s pid %d\n", buf, pid); } -void handle_exec(int clid, int len) +void handle_exec(int client_id, int len) { char buf[len]; int pid, stdin_fd, stdout_fd, stderr_fd; @@ -152,10 +152,10 @@ void handle_exec(int clid, int len) do_fork_exec(buf, &pid, &stdin_fd, &stdout_fd, &stderr_fd); - process_fd[stdout_fd].clid = clid; + process_fd[stdout_fd].client_id = client_id; process_fd[stdout_fd].type = FDTYPE_STDOUT; process_fd[stdout_fd].is_blocked = 0; - process_fd[stderr_fd].clid = clid; + process_fd[stderr_fd].client_id = client_id; process_fd[stderr_fd].type = FDTYPE_STDERR; process_fd[stderr_fd].is_blocked = 0; @@ -166,13 +166,13 @@ void handle_exec(int clid, int len) set_nonblock(stdin_fd); - client_info[clid].stdin_fd = stdin_fd; - client_info[clid].stdout_fd = stdout_fd; - client_info[clid].stderr_fd = stderr_fd; - client_info[clid].pid = pid; - client_info[clid].is_blocked = 0; - client_info[clid].is_close_after_flush_needed = 0; - buffer_init(&client_info[clid].buffer); + client_info[client_id].stdin_fd = stdin_fd; + client_info[client_id].stdout_fd = stdout_fd; + client_info[client_id].stderr_fd = stderr_fd; + client_info[client_id].pid = pid; + client_info[client_id].is_blocked = 0; + client_info[client_id].is_close_after_flush_needed = 0; + buffer_init(&client_info[client_id].buffer); fprintf(stderr, "executed %s pid %d\n", buf, pid); @@ -187,79 +187,79 @@ void update_max_process_fd() max_process_fd = i; } -void send_exit_code(int clid, int status) +void send_exit_code(int client_id, int status) { struct server_header s_hdr; s_hdr.type = MSG_AGENT_TO_SERVER_EXIT_CODE; - s_hdr.clid = clid; + s_hdr.client_id = client_id; s_hdr.len = sizeof status; write_all_vchan_ext(&s_hdr, sizeof s_hdr); write_all_vchan_ext(&status, sizeof(status)); - fprintf(stderr, "send exit code for clid %d pid %d\n", clid, - client_info[clid].pid); + fprintf(stderr, "send exit code for client_id %d pid %d\n", client_id, + client_info[client_id].pid); } // erase process data structures, possibly forced by remote -void remove_process(int clid, int status) +void remove_process(int client_id, int status) { int i; - if (!client_info[clid].pid) + if (!client_info[client_id].pid) return; - fork_and_flush_stdin(client_info[clid].stdin_fd, &client_info[clid].buffer); + fork_and_flush_stdin(client_info[client_id].stdin_fd, &client_info[client_id].buffer); #if 0 // let's let it die by itself, possibly after it has received buffered stdin - kill(client_info[clid].pid, SIGKILL); + kill(client_info[client_id].pid, SIGKILL); #endif if (status != -1) - send_exit_code(clid, status); + send_exit_code(client_id, status); - close(client_info[clid].stdin_fd); - client_info[clid].pid = 0; - client_info[clid].stdin_fd = -1; - client_info[clid].is_blocked = 0; - buffer_free(&client_info[clid].buffer); + close(client_info[client_id].stdin_fd); + client_info[client_id].pid = 0; + client_info[client_id].stdin_fd = -1; + client_info[client_id].is_blocked = 0; + buffer_free(&client_info[client_id].buffer); for (i = 0; i <= max_process_fd; i++) if (process_fd[i].type != FDTYPE_INVALID - && process_fd[i].clid == clid) { + && process_fd[i].client_id == client_id) { process_fd[i].type = FDTYPE_INVALID; - process_fd[i].clid = -1; + process_fd[i].client_id = -1; process_fd[i].is_blocked = 0; close(i); } update_max_process_fd(); } -void handle_input(int clid, int len) +void handle_input(int client_id, int len) { char buf[len]; read_all_vchan_ext(buf, len); - if (!client_info[clid].pid) + if (!client_info[client_id].pid) return; if (len == 0) { - if (client_info[clid].is_blocked) - client_info[clid].is_close_after_flush_needed = 1; + if (client_info[client_id].is_blocked) + client_info[client_id].is_close_after_flush_needed = 1; else { - close(client_info[clid].stdin_fd); - client_info[clid].stdin_fd = -1; + close(client_info[client_id].stdin_fd); + client_info[client_id].stdin_fd = -1; } return; } switch (write_stdin - (client_info[clid].stdin_fd, clid, buf, len, - &client_info[clid].buffer)) { + (client_info[client_id].stdin_fd, client_id, buf, len, + &client_info[client_id].buffer)) { case WRITE_STDIN_OK: break; case WRITE_STDIN_BUFFERED: - client_info[clid].is_blocked = 1; + client_info[client_id].is_blocked = 1; break; case WRITE_STDIN_ERROR: - remove_process(clid, 128); + remove_process(client_id, 128); break; default: fprintf(stderr, "unknown write_stdin?\n"); @@ -268,10 +268,10 @@ void handle_input(int clid, int len) } -void set_blocked_outerr(int clid, int val) +void set_blocked_outerr(int client_id, int val) { - process_fd[client_info[clid].stdout_fd].is_blocked = val; - process_fd[client_info[clid].stderr_fd].is_blocked = val; + process_fd[client_info[client_id].stdout_fd].is_blocked = val; + process_fd[client_info[client_id].stderr_fd].is_blocked = val; } void handle_server_data() @@ -279,27 +279,27 @@ void handle_server_data() struct server_header s_hdr; read_all_vchan_ext(&s_hdr, sizeof s_hdr); -// fprintf(stderr, "got %x %x %x\n", s_hdr.type, s_hdr.clid, +// fprintf(stderr, "got %x %x %x\n", s_hdr.type, s_hdr.client_id, // s_hdr.len); switch (s_hdr.type) { case MSG_XON: - set_blocked_outerr(s_hdr.clid, 0); + set_blocked_outerr(s_hdr.client_id, 0); break; case MSG_XOFF: - set_blocked_outerr(s_hdr.clid, 1); + set_blocked_outerr(s_hdr.client_id, 1); break; case MSG_SERVER_TO_AGENT_EXEC_CMDLINE: - handle_exec(s_hdr.clid, s_hdr.len); + handle_exec(s_hdr.client_id, s_hdr.len); break; case MSG_SERVER_TO_AGENT_JUST_EXEC: - handle_just_exec(s_hdr.clid, s_hdr.len); + handle_just_exec(s_hdr.client_id, s_hdr.len); break; case MSG_SERVER_TO_AGENT_INPUT: - handle_input(s_hdr.clid, s_hdr.len); + handle_input(s_hdr.client_id, s_hdr.len); break; case MSG_SERVER_TO_AGENT_CLIENT_END: - remove_process(s_hdr.clid, -1); + remove_process(s_hdr.client_id, -1); break; default: fprintf(stderr, "msg type from daemon is %d ?\n", @@ -320,15 +320,15 @@ void handle_process_data(int fd) return; ret = read(fd, buf, len - sizeof s_hdr); - s_hdr.clid = process_fd[fd].clid; + s_hdr.client_id = process_fd[fd].client_id; if (process_fd[fd].type == FDTYPE_STDOUT) s_hdr.type = MSG_AGENT_TO_SERVER_STDOUT; else if (process_fd[fd].type == FDTYPE_STDERR) s_hdr.type = MSG_AGENT_TO_SERVER_STDERR; else { - fprintf(stderr, "fd=%d, clid=%d, type=%d ?\n", fd, - process_fd[fd].clid, process_fd[fd].type); + fprintf(stderr, "fd=%d, client_id=%d, type=%d ?\n", fd, + process_fd[fd].client_id, process_fd[fd].type); exit(1); } s_hdr.len = ret; @@ -338,13 +338,13 @@ void handle_process_data(int fd) } if (ret == 0) { process_fd[fd].type = FDTYPE_INVALID; - process_fd[fd].clid = -1; + process_fd[fd].client_id = -1; process_fd[fd].is_blocked = 0; close(fd); update_max_process_fd(); } if (ret < 0) - remove_process(process_fd[fd].clid, 127); + remove_process(process_fd[fd].client_id, 127); } volatile int child_exited; @@ -375,7 +375,7 @@ void handle_process_data_all(fd_set * select_fds) } -void flush_out_err(int clid) +void flush_out_err(int client_id) { fd_set select_set; int fd_max = -1; @@ -387,7 +387,7 @@ void flush_out_err(int clid) for (i = 0; i <= max_process_fd; i++) { if (process_fd[i].type != FDTYPE_INVALID && !process_fd[i].is_blocked - && process_fd[i].clid == clid) { + && process_fd[i].client_id == client_id) { FD_SET(i, &select_set); fd_max = i; } @@ -411,13 +411,13 @@ void reap_children() { int status; int pid; - int clid; + int client_id; while ((pid = waitpid(-1, &status, WNOHANG)) > 0) { - clid = find_info(pid); - if (clid < 0) + client_id = find_info(pid); + if (client_id < 0) continue; - flush_out_err(clid); - remove_process(clid, status); + flush_out_err(client_id); + remove_process(client_id, status); } child_exited = 0; } @@ -450,10 +450,10 @@ int fill_fds_for_select(fd_set * rdset, fd_set * wrset) return max; } -void flush_client_data_agent(int clid) +void flush_client_data_agent(int client_id) { - struct _client_info *info = &client_info[clid]; - switch (flush_client_data(info->stdin_fd, clid, &info->buffer)) { + struct _client_info *info = &client_info[client_id]; + switch (flush_client_data(info->stdin_fd, client_id, &info->buffer)) { case WRITE_STDIN_OK: info->is_blocked = 0; if (info->is_close_after_flush_needed) { @@ -463,7 +463,7 @@ void flush_client_data_agent(int clid) } break; case WRITE_STDIN_ERROR: - remove_process(clid, 128); + remove_process(client_id, 128); break; case WRITE_STDIN_BUFFERED: break; @@ -479,15 +479,15 @@ void handle_trigger_io() char buf[5]; int ret; - s_hdr.clid = 0; + s_hdr.client_id = 0; s_hdr.len = 0; if ((ret = read(trigger_fd, buf, 4)) == 4) { buf[4] = 0; if (!strcmp(buf, "FCPR")) - s_hdr.clid = QREXEC_EXECUTE_FILE_COPY; + s_hdr.client_id = QREXEC_EXECUTE_FILE_COPY; else if (!strcmp(buf, "DVMR")) - s_hdr.clid = QREXEC_EXECUTE_FILE_COPY_FOR_DISPVM; - if (s_hdr.clid) { + s_hdr.client_id = QREXEC_EXECUTE_FILE_COPY_FOR_DISPVM; + if (s_hdr.client_id) { s_hdr.type = MSG_AGENT_TO_SERVER_TRIGGER_EXEC; write_all_vchan_ext(&s_hdr, sizeof s_hdr); } diff --git a/qrexec/qrexec_daemon.c b/qrexec/qrexec_daemon.c index 67c625c9..7d522067 100644 --- a/qrexec/qrexec_daemon.c +++ b/qrexec/qrexec_daemon.c @@ -34,24 +34,30 @@ #include "glue.h" enum client_flags { - CLIENT_INVALID = 0, - CLIENT_CMDLINE = 1, - CLIENT_DATA = 2, - CLIENT_DONT_READ = 4, - CLIENT_OUTQ_FULL = 8 + CLIENT_INVALID = 0, // table slot not used + CLIENT_CMDLINE = 1, // waiting for cmdline from client + CLIENT_DATA = 2, // waiting for data from client + CLIENT_DONT_READ = 4, // don't read from the client, the other side pipe is full, or EOF + CLIENT_OUTQ_FULL = 8 // don't write to client, its stdin pipe is full }; struct _client { - int state; - struct buffer buffer; + int state; // combination of above enum client_flags + struct buffer buffer; // buffered data to client, if any }; -struct _client clients[MAX_FDS]; +/* +The "clients" array is indexed by client's fd. +Thus its size must be equal MAX_FDS; defining MAX_CLIENTS for clarity. +*/ -int max_client_fd = -1; -int server_fd; +#define MAX_CLIENTS MAX_FDS +struct _client clients[MAX_CLIENTS]; // data on all qrexec_client connections -void handle_usr1(int x) +int max_client_fd = -1; // current max fd of all clients; so that we need not to scan all the "clients" table +int qrexec_daemon_unix_socket_fd; // /var/run/qubes/qrexec.xid descriptor + +void sigusr1_handler(int x) { fprintf(stderr, "connected\n"); exit(0); @@ -59,18 +65,19 @@ void handle_usr1(int x) void sigchld_handler(int x); -char *remote_domain_name; +char *remote_domain_name; // guess what +/* do the preparatory tasks, needed before entering the main event loop */ void init(int xid) { - char dbg_log[256]; + char qrexec_error_log_name[256]; int logfd; if (xid <= 0) { fprintf(stderr, "domain id=0?\n"); exit(1); } - signal(SIGUSR1, handle_usr1); + signal(SIGUSR1, sigusr1_handler); switch (fork()) { case -1: perror("fork"); @@ -86,10 +93,10 @@ void init(int xid) exit(0); } close(0); - snprintf(dbg_log, sizeof(dbg_log), + snprintf(qrexec_error_log_name, sizeof(qrexec_error_log_name), "/var/log/qubes/qrexec.%d.log", xid); - umask(0007); - logfd = open(dbg_log, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0640); + umask(0007); // make the log readable by the "qubes" group + logfd = open(qrexec_error_log_name, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0640); dup2(logfd, 1); dup2(logfd, 2); @@ -104,18 +111,18 @@ void init(int xid) setuid(getuid()); /* When running as root, make the socket accessible; perms on /var/run/qubes still apply */ umask(0); - server_fd = get_server_socket(xid, remote_domain_name); + qrexec_daemon_unix_socket_fd = get_server_socket(xid, remote_domain_name); umask(0077); signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); signal(SIGCHLD, sigchld_handler); signal(SIGUSR1, SIG_DFL); - kill(getppid(), SIGUSR1); + kill(getppid(), SIGUSR1); // let the parent know we are ready } void handle_new_client() { - int fd = do_accept(server_fd); - if (fd >= MAX_FDS) { + int fd = do_accept(qrexec_daemon_unix_socket_fd); + if (fd >= MAX_CLIENTS) { fprintf(stderr, "too many clients ?\n"); exit(1); } @@ -125,9 +132,13 @@ void handle_new_client() max_client_fd = fd; } +/* +we need to track the number of children, so that excessive QREXEC_EXECUTE_* +commands do not fork-bomb dom0 +*/ int children_count; -void flush_client(int fd) +void terminate_client_and_flush_data(int fd) { int i; struct server_header s_hdr; @@ -143,29 +154,29 @@ void flush_client(int fd) max_client_fd = i; } s_hdr.type = MSG_SERVER_TO_AGENT_CLIENT_END; - s_hdr.clid = fd; + s_hdr.client_id = fd; s_hdr.len = 0; write_all_vchan_ext(&s_hdr, sizeof(s_hdr)); } -void pass_to_agent(int fd, struct server_header *s_hdr) +void get_cmdline_body_from_client_and_pass_to_agent(int fd, struct server_header *s_hdr) { int len = s_hdr->len; char buf[len]; if (!read_all(fd, buf, len)) { - flush_client(fd); + terminate_client_and_flush_data(fd); return; } write_all_vchan_ext(s_hdr, sizeof(*s_hdr)); write_all_vchan_ext(buf, len); } -void handle_client_cmdline(int fd) +void handle_cmdline_message_from_client(int fd) { struct client_header hdr; struct server_header s_hdr; if (!read_all(fd, &hdr, sizeof hdr)) { - flush_client(fd); + terminate_client_and_flush_data(fd); return; } switch (hdr.type) { @@ -176,59 +187,68 @@ void handle_client_cmdline(int fd) s_hdr.type = MSG_SERVER_TO_AGENT_JUST_EXEC; break; default: - flush_client(fd); + terminate_client_and_flush_data(fd); return; } - s_hdr.clid = fd; + s_hdr.client_id = fd; s_hdr.len = hdr.len; - pass_to_agent(fd, &s_hdr); + get_cmdline_body_from_client_and_pass_to_agent(fd, &s_hdr); clients[fd].state = CLIENT_DATA; - set_nonblock(fd); + set_nonblock(fd); // so that we can detect full queue without blocking if (hdr.type == MSG_CLIENT_TO_SERVER_JUST_EXEC) - flush_client(fd); + terminate_client_and_flush_data(fd); } -void handle_client_data(int fd) +/* handle data received from one of qrexec_client processes */ +void handle_message_from_client(int fd) { struct server_header s_hdr; char buf[MAX_DATA_CHUNK]; int len, ret; if (clients[fd].state == CLIENT_CMDLINE) { - handle_client_cmdline(fd); + handle_cmdline_message_from_client(fd); return; } + // We have already passed cmdline from client. + // Now the client passes us raw data from its stdin. len = buffer_space_vchan_ext(); if (len <= sizeof s_hdr) return; + /* Read at most the amount of data that we have room for in vchan */ ret = read(fd, buf, len - sizeof(s_hdr)); if (ret < 0) { perror("read client"); - flush_client(fd); + terminate_client_and_flush_data(fd); return; } - s_hdr.clid = fd; + s_hdr.client_id = fd; s_hdr.len = ret; s_hdr.type = MSG_SERVER_TO_AGENT_INPUT; write_all_vchan_ext(&s_hdr, sizeof(s_hdr)); write_all_vchan_ext(buf, ret); - if (ret == 0) + if (ret == 0) // EOF - so don't select() on this client clients[fd].state |= CLIENT_DONT_READ; } -void flush_client_data_daemon(int clid) +/* +Called when there is buffered data for this client, and select() reports +that client's pipe is writable; so we should be able to flush some +buffered data. +*/ +void write_buffered_data_to_client(int client_id) { - switch (flush_client_data(clid, clid, &clients[clid].buffer)) { - case WRITE_STDIN_OK: - clients[clid].state &= ~CLIENT_OUTQ_FULL; + switch (flush_client_data(client_id, client_id, &clients[client_id].buffer)) { + case WRITE_STDIN_OK: // no more buffered data + clients[client_id].state &= ~CLIENT_OUTQ_FULL; break; case WRITE_STDIN_ERROR: - flush_client(clid); + terminate_client_and_flush_data(client_id); break; - case WRITE_STDIN_BUFFERED: + case WRITE_STDIN_BUFFERED: // no room for all data, don't clear CLIENT_OUTQ_FULL flag break; default: fprintf(stderr, "unknown flush_client_data?\n"); @@ -236,24 +256,29 @@ void flush_client_data_daemon(int clid) } } -void pass_to_client(int clid, struct client_header *hdr) +/* +The header (hdr argument) is already built. Just read the raw data from +the packet, and pass it along with the header to the client. +*/ +void get_packet_data_from_agent_and_pass_to_client(int client_id, struct client_header *hdr) { int len = hdr->len; char buf[sizeof(*hdr) + len]; + /* make both the header and data be consecutive in the buffer */ *(struct client_header *) buf = *hdr; read_all_vchan_ext(buf + sizeof(*hdr), len); switch (write_stdin - (clid, clid, buf, len + sizeof(*hdr), - &clients[clid].buffer)) { + (client_id, client_id, buf, len + sizeof(*hdr), + &clients[client_id].buffer)) { case WRITE_STDIN_OK: break; - case WRITE_STDIN_BUFFERED: - clients[clid].state |= CLIENT_OUTQ_FULL; + case WRITE_STDIN_BUFFERED: // some data have been buffered + clients[client_id].state |= CLIENT_OUTQ_FULL; break; case WRITE_STDIN_ERROR: - flush_client(clid); + terminate_client_and_flush_data(client_id); break; default: fprintf(stderr, "unknown write_stdin?\n"); @@ -261,6 +286,12 @@ void pass_to_client(int clid, struct client_header *hdr) } } +/* +The signal handler executes asynchronously; therefore all it should do is +to set a flag "signal has arrived", and let the main even loop react to this +flag in appropriate moment. +*/ + int child_exited; void sigchld_handler(int x) @@ -269,6 +300,7 @@ void sigchld_handler(int x) signal(SIGCHLD, sigchld_handler); } +/* clean zombies, update children_count */ void reap_children() { int status; @@ -277,6 +309,7 @@ void reap_children() child_exited = 0; } +/* too many children - wait for one of them to terminate */ void wait_for_child() { int status; @@ -285,7 +318,7 @@ void wait_for_child() } #define MAX_CHILDREN 10 -void check_children_count() +void check_children_count_and_wait_if_too_many() { if (children_count > MAX_CHILDREN) { fprintf(stderr, @@ -296,12 +329,16 @@ void check_children_count() } } -void handle_trigger_exec(int req) +/* +Called when agent sends a message asking to execute a predefined command. +*/ + +void handle_execute_predefined_command(int req) { char *rcmd = NULL, *lcmd = NULL; int i; - check_children_count(); + check_children_count_and_wait_if_too_many(); switch (req) { case QREXEC_EXECUTE_FILE_COPY: rcmd = "directly:user:/usr/lib/qubes/qfile-agent"; @@ -311,7 +348,7 @@ void handle_trigger_exec(int req) rcmd = "directly:user:/usr/lib/qubes/qfile-agent-dvm"; lcmd = "/usr/lib/qubes/qfile-daemon-dvm"; break; - default: + default: /* cannot happen, already sanitized */ fprintf(stderr, "got trigger exec no %d\n", req); exit(1); } @@ -325,7 +362,7 @@ void handle_trigger_exec(int req) children_count++; return; } - for (i = 3; i < 256; i++) + for (i = 3; i < MAX_FDS; i++) close(i); signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL); signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_DFL); @@ -335,10 +372,10 @@ void handle_trigger_exec(int req) exit(1); } -void check_clid_in_range(unsigned int untrusted_clid) +void check_client_id_in_range(unsigned int untrusted_client_id) { - if (untrusted_clid >= MAX_FDS || untrusted_clid < 0) { - fprintf(stderr, "from agent: clid=%d\n", untrusted_clid); + if (untrusted_client_id >= MAX_CLIENTS || untrusted_client_id < 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "from agent: client_id=%d\n", untrusted_client_id); exit(1); } } @@ -349,7 +386,7 @@ void sanitize_message_from_agent(struct server_header *untrusted_header) int untrusted_cmd; switch (untrusted_header->type) { case MSG_AGENT_TO_SERVER_TRIGGER_EXEC: - untrusted_cmd = untrusted_header->clid; + untrusted_cmd = untrusted_header->client_id; if (untrusted_cmd != QREXEC_EXECUTE_FILE_COPY && untrusted_cmd != QREXEC_EXECUTE_FILE_COPY_FOR_DISPVM) { fprintf(stderr, @@ -361,7 +398,7 @@ void sanitize_message_from_agent(struct server_header *untrusted_header) case MSG_AGENT_TO_SERVER_STDOUT: case MSG_SERVER_TO_CLIENT_STDERR: case MSG_AGENT_TO_SERVER_EXIT_CODE: - check_clid_in_range(untrusted_header->clid); + check_client_id_in_range(untrusted_header->client_id); if (untrusted_header->len > MAX_DATA_CHUNK || untrusted_header->len < 0) { fprintf(stderr, "agent feeded %d of data bytes?\n", @@ -372,7 +409,7 @@ void sanitize_message_from_agent(struct server_header *untrusted_header) case MSG_XOFF: case MSG_XON: - check_clid_in_range(untrusted_header->clid); + check_client_id_in_range(untrusted_header->client_id); break; default: fprintf(stderr, "unknown mesage type %d from agent\n", @@ -381,7 +418,7 @@ void sanitize_message_from_agent(struct server_header *untrusted_header) } } -void handle_agent_data() +void handle_message_from_agent() { struct client_header hdr; struct server_header s_hdr, untrusted_s_hdr; @@ -392,20 +429,21 @@ void handle_agent_data() s_hdr = untrusted_s_hdr; /* sanitize end */ -// fprintf(stderr, "got %x %x %x\n", s_hdr.type, s_hdr.clid, +// fprintf(stderr, "got %x %x %x\n", s_hdr.type, s_hdr.client_id, // s_hdr.len); if (s_hdr.type == MSG_AGENT_TO_SERVER_TRIGGER_EXEC) { - handle_trigger_exec(s_hdr.clid); + handle_execute_predefined_command(s_hdr.client_id); return; } if (s_hdr.type == MSG_XOFF) { - clients[s_hdr.clid].state |= CLIENT_DONT_READ; + clients[s_hdr.client_id].state |= CLIENT_DONT_READ; return; } + if (s_hdr.type == MSG_XON) { - clients[s_hdr.clid].state &= ~CLIENT_DONT_READ; + clients[s_hdr.client_id].state &= ~CLIENT_DONT_READ; return; } @@ -419,49 +457,56 @@ void handle_agent_data() case MSG_AGENT_TO_SERVER_EXIT_CODE: hdr.type = MSG_SERVER_TO_CLIENT_EXIT_CODE; break; - default: /* cannot happen */ + default: /* cannot happen, already sanitized */ fprintf(stderr, "from agent: type=%d\n", s_hdr.type); exit(1); } hdr.len = s_hdr.len; - if (clients[s_hdr.clid].state == CLIENT_INVALID) { + if (clients[s_hdr.client_id].state == CLIENT_INVALID) { // benefit of doubt - maybe client exited earlier + // just eat the packet data and continue char buf[MAX_DATA_CHUNK]; read_all_vchan_ext(buf, s_hdr.len); return; } - pass_to_client(s_hdr.clid, &hdr); + get_packet_data_from_agent_and_pass_to_client(s_hdr.client_id, &hdr); if (s_hdr.type == MSG_AGENT_TO_SERVER_EXIT_CODE) - flush_client(s_hdr.clid); + terminate_client_and_flush_data(s_hdr.client_id); } -int fill_fds_for_select(fd_set * rdset, fd_set * wrset) +/* +Scan the "clients" table, add ones we want to read from (because the other +end has not send MSG_XOFF on them) to read_fdset, add ones we want to write +to (because its pipe is full) to write_fdset. Return the highest used file +descriptor number, needed for the first select() parameter. +*/ +int fill_fdsets_for_select(fd_set * read_fdset, fd_set * write_fdset) { int i; int max = -1; - FD_ZERO(rdset); - FD_ZERO(wrset); + FD_ZERO(read_fdset); + FD_ZERO(write_fdset); for (i = 0; i <= max_client_fd; i++) { if (clients[i].state != CLIENT_INVALID && !(clients[i].state & CLIENT_DONT_READ)) { - FD_SET(i, rdset); + FD_SET(i, read_fdset); max = i; } if (clients[i].state != CLIENT_INVALID && clients[i].state & CLIENT_OUTQ_FULL) { - FD_SET(i, wrset); + FD_SET(i, write_fdset); max = i; } } - FD_SET(server_fd, rdset); - if (server_fd > max) - max = server_fd; + FD_SET(qrexec_daemon_unix_socket_fd, read_fdset); + if (qrexec_daemon_unix_socket_fd > max) + max = qrexec_daemon_unix_socket_fd; return max; } int main(int argc, char **argv) { - fd_set rdset, wrset; + fd_set read_fdset, write_fdset; int i; int max; @@ -470,29 +515,36 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) exit(1); } init(atoi(argv[1])); + /* + The main event loop. Waits for one of the following events: + - message from client + - message from agent + - new client + - child exited + */ for (;;) { - max = fill_fds_for_select(&rdset, &wrset); + max = fill_fdsets_for_select(&read_fdset, &write_fdset); if (buffer_space_vchan_ext() <= sizeof(struct server_header)) - FD_ZERO(&rdset); + FD_ZERO(&read_fdset); // vchan full - don't read from clients - wait_for_vchan_or_argfd(max, &rdset, &wrset); + wait_for_vchan_or_argfd(max, &read_fdset, &write_fdset); - if (FD_ISSET(server_fd, &rdset)) + if (FD_ISSET(qrexec_daemon_unix_socket_fd, &read_fdset)) handle_new_client(); while (read_ready_vchan_ext()) - handle_agent_data(); + handle_message_from_agent(); for (i = 0; i <= max_client_fd; i++) if (clients[i].state != CLIENT_INVALID - && FD_ISSET(i, &rdset)) - handle_client_data(i); + && FD_ISSET(i, &read_fdset)) + handle_message_from_client(i); for (i = 0; i <= max_client_fd; i++) if (clients[i].state != CLIENT_INVALID - && FD_ISSET(i, &wrset)) - flush_client_data_daemon(i); + && FD_ISSET(i, &write_fdset)) + write_buffered_data_to_client(i); if (child_exited) reap_children(); diff --git a/qrexec/write_stdin.c b/qrexec/write_stdin.c index f2bbae9e..e77ccf55 100644 --- a/qrexec/write_stdin.c +++ b/qrexec/write_stdin.c @@ -29,7 +29,12 @@ #include "buffer.h" #include "glue.h" -int flush_client_data(int fd, int clid, struct buffer *buffer) +/* +There is buffered data in "buffer" for client id "client_id", and select() +reports that "fd" is writable. Write as much as possible to fd, if all sent, +notify the peer that this client's pipe is no longer full. +*/ +int flush_client_data(int fd, int client_id, struct buffer *buffer) { int ret; int len; @@ -49,7 +54,7 @@ int flush_client_data(int fd, int clid, struct buffer *buffer) if (!len) { struct server_header s_hdr; s_hdr.type = MSG_XON; - s_hdr.clid = clid; + s_hdr.client_id = client_id; s_hdr.len = 0; write_all_vchan_ext(&s_hdr, sizeof s_hdr); return WRITE_STDIN_OK; @@ -58,7 +63,12 @@ int flush_client_data(int fd, int clid, struct buffer *buffer) } -int write_stdin(int fd, int clid, char *data, int len, +/* +Write "len" bytes from "data" to "fd". If not all written, buffer the rest +to "buffer", and notify the peer that the client "client_id" pipe is full via +MSG_XOFF message. +*/ +int write_stdin(int fd, int client_id, char *data, int len, struct buffer *buffer) { int ret; @@ -84,7 +94,7 @@ int write_stdin(int fd, int clid, char *data, int len, len - written); s_hdr.type = MSG_XOFF; - s_hdr.clid = clid; + s_hdr.client_id = client_id; s_hdr.len = 0; write_all_vchan_ext(&s_hdr, sizeof s_hdr); @@ -108,6 +118,11 @@ void set_block(int fd) fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, fl & ~O_NONBLOCK); } +/* +Data feed process has exited, so we need to clear all control structures for +the client. However, if we have buffered data for the client (which is rare btw), +fire&forget a separate process to flush them. +*/ int fork_and_flush_stdin(int fd, struct buffer *buffer) { int i; From b4fb7a4b5d6776856210b4b70e2f21730aa99a93 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Rafal Wojtczuk Date: Wed, 4 May 2011 12:56:52 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 3/8] qrexec: added two I/O error checks, even though it is redundant in these cases --- qrexec/qrexec_daemon.c | 5 +++++ qrexec/write_stdin.c | 5 ++++- 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/qrexec/qrexec_daemon.c b/qrexec/qrexec_daemon.c index 7d522067..a5d2bdc6 100644 --- a/qrexec/qrexec_daemon.c +++ b/qrexec/qrexec_daemon.c @@ -98,6 +98,11 @@ void init(int xid) umask(0007); // make the log readable by the "qubes" group logfd = open(qrexec_error_log_name, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0640); + if (logfd < 0) { + perror("open"); + exit(1); + } + dup2(logfd, 1); dup2(logfd, 2); diff --git a/qrexec/write_stdin.c b/qrexec/write_stdin.c index e77ccf55..7ace53b6 100644 --- a/qrexec/write_stdin.c +++ b/qrexec/write_stdin.c @@ -49,7 +49,10 @@ int flush_client_data(int fd, int client_id, struct buffer *buffer) } else return WRITE_STDIN_BUFFERED; } - buffer_remove(buffer, len); + // we previously called buffer_remove(buffer, len) + // it will be wrong if we change MAX_DATA_CHUNK to something large + // as pipes writes are atomic only to PIPE_MAX limit + buffer_remove(buffer, ret); len = buffer_len(buffer); if (!len) { struct server_header s_hdr; From d84289f9838b1247d22a6e227427a9df8d96f84d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Rafal Wojtczuk Date: Wed, 4 May 2011 13:00:39 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 4/8] qrexec - indentation --- qrexec/qrexec_agent.c | 18 ++++++++----- qrexec/qrexec_daemon.c | 58 +++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------- 2 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-) diff --git a/qrexec/qrexec_agent.c b/qrexec/qrexec_agent.c index 9e7347fc..4f24b873 100644 --- a/qrexec/qrexec_agent.c +++ b/qrexec/qrexec_agent.c @@ -195,8 +195,8 @@ void send_exit_code(int client_id, int status) s_hdr.len = sizeof status; write_all_vchan_ext(&s_hdr, sizeof s_hdr); write_all_vchan_ext(&status, sizeof(status)); - fprintf(stderr, "send exit code for client_id %d pid %d\n", client_id, - client_info[client_id].pid); + fprintf(stderr, "send exit code for client_id %d pid %d\n", + client_id, client_info[client_id].pid); } @@ -206,8 +206,9 @@ void remove_process(int client_id, int status) int i; if (!client_info[client_id].pid) return; - fork_and_flush_stdin(client_info[client_id].stdin_fd, &client_info[client_id].buffer); -#if 0 + fork_and_flush_stdin(client_info[client_id].stdin_fd, + &client_info[client_id].buffer); +#if 0 // let's let it die by itself, possibly after it has received buffered stdin kill(client_info[client_id].pid, SIGKILL); #endif @@ -242,7 +243,8 @@ void handle_input(int client_id, int len) if (len == 0) { if (client_info[client_id].is_blocked) - client_info[client_id].is_close_after_flush_needed = 1; + client_info[client_id]. + is_close_after_flush_needed = 1; else { close(client_info[client_id].stdin_fd); client_info[client_id].stdin_fd = -1; @@ -453,7 +455,8 @@ int fill_fds_for_select(fd_set * rdset, fd_set * wrset) void flush_client_data_agent(int client_id) { struct _client_info *info = &client_info[client_id]; - switch (flush_client_data(info->stdin_fd, client_id, &info->buffer)) { + switch (flush_client_data + (info->stdin_fd, client_id, &info->buffer)) { case WRITE_STDIN_OK: info->is_blocked = 0; if (info->is_close_after_flush_needed) { @@ -486,7 +489,8 @@ void handle_trigger_io() if (!strcmp(buf, "FCPR")) s_hdr.client_id = QREXEC_EXECUTE_FILE_COPY; else if (!strcmp(buf, "DVMR")) - s_hdr.client_id = QREXEC_EXECUTE_FILE_COPY_FOR_DISPVM; + s_hdr.client_id = + QREXEC_EXECUTE_FILE_COPY_FOR_DISPVM; if (s_hdr.client_id) { s_hdr.type = MSG_AGENT_TO_SERVER_TRIGGER_EXEC; write_all_vchan_ext(&s_hdr, sizeof s_hdr); diff --git a/qrexec/qrexec_daemon.c b/qrexec/qrexec_daemon.c index a5d2bdc6..69e81797 100644 --- a/qrexec/qrexec_daemon.c +++ b/qrexec/qrexec_daemon.c @@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ Thus its size must be equal MAX_FDS; defining MAX_CLIENTS for clarity. */ #define MAX_CLIENTS MAX_FDS -struct _client clients[MAX_CLIENTS]; // data on all qrexec_client connections +struct _client clients[MAX_CLIENTS]; // data on all qrexec_client connections int max_client_fd = -1; // current max fd of all clients; so that we need not to scan all the "clients" table int qrexec_daemon_unix_socket_fd; // /var/run/qubes/qrexec.xid descriptor @@ -95,13 +95,15 @@ void init(int xid) close(0); snprintf(qrexec_error_log_name, sizeof(qrexec_error_log_name), "/var/log/qubes/qrexec.%d.log", xid); - umask(0007); // make the log readable by the "qubes" group - logfd = open(qrexec_error_log_name, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0640); + umask(0007); // make the log readable by the "qubes" group + logfd = + open(qrexec_error_log_name, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, + 0640); if (logfd < 0) { - perror("open"); - exit(1); - } + perror("open"); + exit(1); + } dup2(logfd, 1); dup2(logfd, 2); @@ -116,7 +118,8 @@ void init(int xid) setuid(getuid()); /* When running as root, make the socket accessible; perms on /var/run/qubes still apply */ umask(0); - qrexec_daemon_unix_socket_fd = get_server_socket(xid, remote_domain_name); + qrexec_daemon_unix_socket_fd = + get_server_socket(xid, remote_domain_name); umask(0077); signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); signal(SIGCHLD, sigchld_handler); @@ -164,7 +167,9 @@ void terminate_client_and_flush_data(int fd) write_all_vchan_ext(&s_hdr, sizeof(s_hdr)); } -void get_cmdline_body_from_client_and_pass_to_agent(int fd, struct server_header *s_hdr) +void get_cmdline_body_from_client_and_pass_to_agent(int fd, + struct server_header + *s_hdr) { int len = s_hdr->len; char buf[len]; @@ -222,7 +227,7 @@ void handle_message_from_client(int fd) len = buffer_space_vchan_ext(); if (len <= sizeof s_hdr) return; - /* Read at most the amount of data that we have room for in vchan */ + /* Read at most the amount of data that we have room for in vchan */ ret = read(fd, buf, len - sizeof(s_hdr)); if (ret < 0) { perror("read client"); @@ -246,8 +251,9 @@ buffered data. */ void write_buffered_data_to_client(int client_id) { - switch (flush_client_data(client_id, client_id, &clients[client_id].buffer)) { - case WRITE_STDIN_OK: // no more buffered data + switch (flush_client_data + (client_id, client_id, &clients[client_id].buffer)) { + case WRITE_STDIN_OK: // no more buffered data clients[client_id].state &= ~CLIENT_OUTQ_FULL; break; case WRITE_STDIN_ERROR: @@ -265,7 +271,9 @@ void write_buffered_data_to_client(int client_id) The header (hdr argument) is already built. Just read the raw data from the packet, and pass it along with the header to the client. */ -void get_packet_data_from_agent_and_pass_to_client(int client_id, struct client_header *hdr) +void get_packet_data_from_agent_and_pass_to_client(int client_id, + struct client_header + *hdr) { int len = hdr->len; char buf[sizeof(*hdr) + len]; @@ -280,7 +288,7 @@ void get_packet_data_from_agent_and_pass_to_client(int client_id, struct client_ case WRITE_STDIN_OK: break; case WRITE_STDIN_BUFFERED: // some data have been buffered - clients[client_id].state |= CLIENT_OUTQ_FULL; + clients[client_id].state |= CLIENT_OUTQ_FULL; break; case WRITE_STDIN_ERROR: terminate_client_and_flush_data(client_id); @@ -353,7 +361,7 @@ void handle_execute_predefined_command(int req) rcmd = "directly:user:/usr/lib/qubes/qfile-agent-dvm"; lcmd = "/usr/lib/qubes/qfile-daemon-dvm"; break; - default: /* cannot happen, already sanitized */ + default: /* cannot happen, already sanitized */ fprintf(stderr, "got trigger exec no %d\n", req); exit(1); } @@ -380,7 +388,8 @@ void handle_execute_predefined_command(int req) void check_client_id_in_range(unsigned int untrusted_client_id) { if (untrusted_client_id >= MAX_CLIENTS || untrusted_client_id < 0) { - fprintf(stderr, "from agent: client_id=%d\n", untrusted_client_id); + fprintf(stderr, "from agent: client_id=%d\n", + untrusted_client_id); exit(1); } } @@ -462,7 +471,7 @@ void handle_message_from_agent() case MSG_AGENT_TO_SERVER_EXIT_CODE: hdr.type = MSG_SERVER_TO_CLIENT_EXIT_CODE; break; - default: /* cannot happen, already sanitized */ + default: /* cannot happen, already sanitized */ fprintf(stderr, "from agent: type=%d\n", s_hdr.type); exit(1); } @@ -474,7 +483,8 @@ void handle_message_from_agent() read_all_vchan_ext(buf, s_hdr.len); return; } - get_packet_data_from_agent_and_pass_to_client(s_hdr.client_id, &hdr); + get_packet_data_from_agent_and_pass_to_client(s_hdr.client_id, + &hdr); if (s_hdr.type == MSG_AGENT_TO_SERVER_EXIT_CODE) terminate_client_and_flush_data(s_hdr.client_id); } @@ -521,17 +531,17 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) } init(atoi(argv[1])); /* - The main event loop. Waits for one of the following events: - - message from client - - message from agent - - new client - - child exited - */ + The main event loop. Waits for one of the following events: + - message from client + - message from agent + - new client + - child exited + */ for (;;) { max = fill_fdsets_for_select(&read_fdset, &write_fdset); if (buffer_space_vchan_ext() <= sizeof(struct server_header)) - FD_ZERO(&read_fdset); // vchan full - don't read from clients + FD_ZERO(&read_fdset); // vchan full - don't read from clients wait_for_vchan_or_argfd(max, &read_fdset, &write_fdset); From 18e207cbc52110f22b22ab625e395dae24e67463 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Rafal Wojtczuk Date: Wed, 4 May 2011 17:10:01 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 5/8] qmemman: prefix variables read from xenstore with "untrusted_" Additionally move all already existing checks to an already existing is_meminfo_suspicious procedure. --- dom0/qmemman/qmemman.py | 4 +-- dom0/qmemman/qmemman_algo.py | 65 ++++++++++++++++++++-------------- dom0/qmemman/qmemman_server.py | 6 ++-- 3 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-) diff --git a/dom0/qmemman/qmemman.py b/dom0/qmemman/qmemman.py index bf57986b..7c073636 100755 --- a/dom0/qmemman/qmemman.py +++ b/dom0/qmemman/qmemman.py @@ -96,8 +96,8 @@ class SystemState: time.sleep(self.BALOON_DELAY) niter = niter + 1 - def refresh_meminfo(self, domid, val): - qmemman_algo.refresh_meminfo_for_domain(self.domdict[domid], val) + def refresh_meminfo(self, domid, untrusted_meminfo_key): + qmemman_algo.refresh_meminfo_for_domain(self.domdict[domid], untrusted_meminfo_key) self.do_balance() def is_balance_req_significant(self, memset_reqs, xenfree): diff --git a/dom0/qmemman/qmemman_algo.py b/dom0/qmemman/qmemman_algo.py index 1cda2c81..a7a3efbe 100755 --- a/dom0/qmemman/qmemman_algo.py +++ b/dom0/qmemman/qmemman_algo.py @@ -1,45 +1,58 @@ import string -def parse_meminfo(meminfo): - dict = {} - l1 = string.split(meminfo,"\n") - for i in l1: - l2 = string.split(i) - if len(l2) >= 2: - dict[string.rstrip(l2[0], ":")] = l2[1] +#untrusted meminfo size is taken from xenstore key, thus its size is limited +#so splits do not require excessive memory +def parse_meminfo(untrusted_meminfo): + untrusted_dict = {} +#split meminfo contents into lines + untrusted_lines = string.split(untrusted_meminfo,"\n") + for untrusted_lines_iterator in untrusted_lines: +#split a single meminfo line into words + untrusted_words = string.split(untrusted_lines_iterator) + if len(untrusted_words) >= 2: + untrusted_dict[string.rstrip(untrusted_words[0], ":")] = untrusted_words[1] + return untrusted_dict + +def is_meminfo_suspicious(dom, untrusted_meminfo): + ret = False + +#check whether the required keys exist and are not negative try: for i in ('MemTotal', 'MemFree', 'Buffers', 'Cached', 'SwapTotal', 'SwapFree'): - val = int(dict[i])*1024 + val = int(untrusted_meminfo[i])*1024 if (val < 0): - return None - dict[i] = val + ret = True + untrusted_meminfo[i] = val except: - return None - - if dict['SwapTotal'] < dict['SwapFree']: - return None - return dict - -def is_suspicious(dom): - ret = False - if dom.meminfo['SwapTotal'] < dom.meminfo['SwapFree']: ret = True - if dom.meminfo['MemTotal'] < dom.meminfo['MemFree'] + dom.meminfo['Cached'] + dom.meminfo['Buffers']: + + if not ret and untrusted_meminfo['SwapTotal'] < untrusted_meminfo['SwapFree']: ret = True + if not ret and untrusted_meminfo['MemTotal'] < untrusted_meminfo['MemFree'] + untrusted_meminfo['Cached'] + untrusted_meminfo['Buffers']: + ret = True +#we could also impose some limits on all the above values +#but it has little purpose - all the domain can gain by passing e.g. +#very large SwapTotal is that it will be assigned all free Xen memory +#it can be achieved with legal values, too, and it will not allow to +#starve existing domains, by design if ret: - print 'suspicious meminfo for domain', dom.id, 'mem actual', dom.memory_actual, dom.meminfo + print 'suspicious meminfo for domain', dom.id, 'mem actual', dom.memory_actual, untrusted_meminfo return ret -def refresh_meminfo_for_domain(dom, xenstore_key): - meminfo = parse_meminfo(xenstore_key) - dom.meminfo = meminfo - if meminfo is None: +def refresh_meminfo_for_domain(dom, untrusted_xenstore_key): + untrusted_meminfo = parse_meminfo(untrusted_xenstore_key) + if untrusted_meminfo is None: + dom.meminfo = None return - if is_suspicious(dom): +#sanitize start + if is_meminfo_suspicious(dom, untrusted_meminfo): +#sanitize end dom.meminfo = None dom.mem_used = None else: +#sanitized, can assign + dom.meminfo = untrusted_meminfo dom.mem_used = dom.meminfo['MemTotal'] - dom.meminfo['MemFree'] - dom.meminfo['Cached'] - dom.meminfo['Buffers'] + dom.meminfo['SwapTotal'] - dom.meminfo['SwapFree'] def prefmem(dom): diff --git a/dom0/qmemman/qmemman_server.py b/dom0/qmemman/qmemman_server.py index 52e35664..929aa93b 100755 --- a/dom0/qmemman/qmemman_server.py +++ b/dom0/qmemman/qmemman_server.py @@ -49,11 +49,11 @@ class XS_Watcher: global_lock.release() def request(self, domain_id): - ret = self.handle.read('', get_req_node(domain_id)) - if ret == None or ret == '': + untrusted_meminfo_key = self.handle.read('', get_req_node(domain_id)) + if untrusted_meminfo_key == None or untrusted_meminfo_key == '': return global_lock.acquire() - system_state.refresh_meminfo(domain_id, ret) + system_state.refresh_meminfo(domain_id, untrusted_meminfo_key) global_lock.release() def watch_loop(self): From 6067be29dfaa785eaa4388ba0b01661b09f285a8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Rafal Wojtczuk Date: Wed, 4 May 2011 17:58:28 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 6/8] qmemman: add comments, make some identifiers more verbose --- dom0/qmemman/qmemman.py | 15 ++-- dom0/qmemman/qmemman_algo.py | 129 +++++++++++++++++++-------------- dom0/qmemman/qmemman_server.py | 18 +++-- 3 files changed, 93 insertions(+), 69 deletions(-) diff --git a/dom0/qmemman/qmemman.py b/dom0/qmemman/qmemman.py index 7c073636..243ca6fa 100755 --- a/dom0/qmemman/qmemman.py +++ b/dom0/qmemman/qmemman.py @@ -7,11 +7,11 @@ import os class DomainState: def __init__(self, id): - self.meminfo = None - self.memory_actual = None - self.mem_used = None - self.id = id - self.last_target = 0 + self.meminfo = None #dictionary of memory info read from client + self.memory_actual = None #the current memory size + self.mem_used = None #used memory, computed based on meminfo + self.id = id #domain id + self.last_target = 0 #the last memset target class SystemState: def __init__(self): @@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ class SystemState: # ret = host_metrics_record["memory_free"] # return long(ret) +#refresh information on memory assigned to all domains def refresh_memactual(self): for domain in self.xc.domain_getinfo(): id = str(domain['domid']) @@ -67,6 +68,7 @@ class SystemState: except XenAPI.Failure: pass +#perform memory ballooning, across all domains, to add "memsize" to Xen free memory def do_balloon(self, memsize): MAX_TRIES = 20 niter = 0 @@ -82,6 +84,7 @@ class SystemState: if prev_memory_actual is not None: for i in prev_memory_actual.keys(): if prev_memory_actual[i] == self.domdict[i].memory_actual: + #domain not responding to memset requests, remove it from donors self.domdict[i].no_progress = True print 'domain', i, 'stuck at', self.domdict[i].memory_actual memset_reqs = qmemman_algo.balloon(memsize + self.XEN_FREE_MEM_LEFT - xenfree, self.domdict) @@ -100,6 +103,8 @@ class SystemState: qmemman_algo.refresh_meminfo_for_domain(self.domdict[domid], untrusted_meminfo_key) self.do_balance() +#is the computed balance request big enough ? +#so that we do not trash with small adjustments def is_balance_req_significant(self, memset_reqs, xenfree): total_memory_transfer = 0 MIN_TOTAL_MEMORY_TRANSFER = 150*1024*1024 diff --git a/dom0/qmemman/qmemman_algo.py b/dom0/qmemman/qmemman_algo.py index a7a3efbe..43bbeefc 100755 --- a/dom0/qmemman/qmemman_algo.py +++ b/dom0/qmemman/qmemman_algo.py @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ def parse_meminfo(untrusted_meminfo): return untrusted_dict -def is_meminfo_suspicious(dom, untrusted_meminfo): +def is_meminfo_suspicious(domain, untrusted_meminfo): ret = False #check whether the required keys exist and are not negative @@ -37,51 +37,54 @@ def is_meminfo_suspicious(dom, untrusted_meminfo): #it can be achieved with legal values, too, and it will not allow to #starve existing domains, by design if ret: - print 'suspicious meminfo for domain', dom.id, 'mem actual', dom.memory_actual, untrusted_meminfo + print 'suspicious meminfo for domain', domain.id, 'mem actual', domain.memory_actual, untrusted_meminfo return ret -def refresh_meminfo_for_domain(dom, untrusted_xenstore_key): +#called when a domain updates its 'meminfo' xenstore key +def refresh_meminfo_for_domain(domain, untrusted_xenstore_key): untrusted_meminfo = parse_meminfo(untrusted_xenstore_key) if untrusted_meminfo is None: - dom.meminfo = None + domain.meminfo = None return #sanitize start - if is_meminfo_suspicious(dom, untrusted_meminfo): + if is_meminfo_suspicious(domain, untrusted_meminfo): #sanitize end - dom.meminfo = None - dom.mem_used = None + domain.meminfo = None + domain.mem_used = None else: #sanitized, can assign - dom.meminfo = untrusted_meminfo - dom.mem_used = dom.meminfo['MemTotal'] - dom.meminfo['MemFree'] - dom.meminfo['Cached'] - dom.meminfo['Buffers'] + dom.meminfo['SwapTotal'] - dom.meminfo['SwapFree'] + domain.meminfo = untrusted_meminfo + domain.mem_used = domain.meminfo['MemTotal'] - domain.meminfo['MemFree'] - domain.meminfo['Cached'] - domain.meminfo['Buffers'] + domain.meminfo['SwapTotal'] - domain.meminfo['SwapFree'] -def prefmem(dom): +def prefmem(domain): CACHE_FACTOR = 1.3 #dom0 is special, as it must have large cache, for vbds. Thus, give it a special boost - if dom.id == '0': - return dom.mem_used*CACHE_FACTOR + 350*1024*1024 - return dom.mem_used*CACHE_FACTOR + if domain.id == '0': + return domain.mem_used*CACHE_FACTOR + 350*1024*1024 + return domain.mem_used*CACHE_FACTOR -def memneeded(dom): +def memory_needed(domain): #do not change -#in balance(), "distribute totalsum proportionally to mempref" relies on this exact formula - ret = prefmem(dom) - dom.memory_actual +#in balance(), "distribute total_available_memory proportionally to mempref" relies on this exact formula + ret = prefmem(domain) - domain.memory_actual return ret - -def balloon(memsize, domdict): +#prepare list of (domain, memory_target) pairs that need to be passed +#to "xm memset" equivalent in order to obtain "memsize" of memory +#return empty list when the request cannot be satisfied +def balloon(memsize, domain_dictionary): REQ_SAFETY_NET_FACTOR = 1.05 donors = list() request = list() available = 0 - for i in domdict.keys(): - if domdict[i].meminfo is None: + for i in domain_dictionary.keys(): + if domain_dictionary[i].meminfo is None: continue - if domdict[i].no_progress: + if domain_dictionary[i].no_progress: continue - need = memneeded(domdict[i]) + need = memory_needed(domain_dictionary[i]) if need < 0: - print 'balloon: dom' , i, 'has actual memory', domdict[i].memory_actual + print 'balloon: dom' , i, 'has actual memory', domain_dictionary[i].memory_actual donors.append((i,-need)) available-=need print 'req=', memsize, 'avail=', available, 'donors', donors @@ -92,78 +95,92 @@ def balloon(memsize, domdict): id, mem = donors_iter memborrowed = mem*scale*REQ_SAFETY_NET_FACTOR print 'borrow' , memborrowed, 'from', id - memtarget = int(domdict[id].memory_actual - memborrowed) + memtarget = int(domain_dictionary[id].memory_actual - memborrowed) request.append((id, memtarget)) return request # REQ_SAFETY_NET_FACTOR is a bit greater that 1. So that if the domain yields a bit less than requested, due # to e.g. rounding errors, we will not get stuck. The surplus will return to the VM during "balance" call. -#redistribute positive "totalsum" of memory between domains, proportionally to prefmem -def balance_when_enough_memory(domdict, xenfree, total_mem_pref, totalsum): +#redistribute positive "total_available_memory" of memory between domains, proportionally to prefmem +def balance_when_enough_memory(domain_dictionary, xen_free_memory, total_mem_pref, total_available_memory): donors_rq = list() acceptors_rq = list() - for i in domdict.keys(): - if domdict[i].meminfo is None: + for i in domain_dictionary.keys(): + if domain_dictionary[i].meminfo is None: continue -#distribute totalsum proportionally to mempref - scale = 1.0*prefmem(domdict[i])/total_mem_pref - target_nonint = prefmem(domdict[i]) + scale*totalsum +#distribute total_available_memory proportionally to mempref + scale = 1.0*prefmem(domain_dictionary[i])/total_mem_pref + target_nonint = prefmem(domain_dictionary[i]) + scale*total_available_memory #prevent rounding errors target = int(0.999*target_nonint) - if (target < domdict[i].memory_actual): + if (target < domain_dictionary[i].memory_actual): donors_rq.append((i, target)) else: acceptors_rq.append((i, target)) -# print 'balance(enough): xenfree=', xenfree, 'requests:', donors_rq + acceptors_rq +# print 'balance(enough): xen_free_memory=', xen_free_memory, 'requests:', donors_rq + acceptors_rq return donors_rq + acceptors_rq #when not enough mem to make everyone be above prefmem, make donors be at prefmem, and #redistribute anything left between acceptors -def balance_when_low_on_memory(domdict, xenfree, total_mem_pref_acceptors, donors, acceptors): +def balance_when_low_on_memory(domain_dictionary, xen_free_memory, total_mem_pref_acceptors, donors, acceptors): donors_rq = list() acceptors_rq = list() - squeezed_mem = xenfree + squeezed_mem = xen_free_memory for i in donors: - avail = -memneeded(domdict[i]) + avail = -memory_needed(domain_dictionary[i]) if avail < 10*1024*1024: #probably we have already tried making it exactly at prefmem, give up continue squeezed_mem -= avail - donors_rq.append((i, prefmem(domdict[i]))) + donors_rq.append((i, prefmem(domain_dictionary[i]))) #the below can happen if initially xen free memory is below 50M if squeezed_mem < 0: return donors_rq for i in acceptors: - scale = 1.0*prefmem(domdict[i])/total_mem_pref_acceptors - target_nonint = domdict[i].memory_actual + scale*squeezed_mem + scale = 1.0*prefmem(domain_dictionary[i])/total_mem_pref_acceptors + target_nonint = domain_dictionary[i].memory_actual + scale*squeezed_mem acceptors_rq.append((i, int(target_nonint))) -# print 'balance(low): xenfree=', xenfree, 'requests:', donors_rq + acceptors_rq +# print 'balance(low): xen_free_memory=', xen_free_memory, 'requests:', donors_rq + acceptors_rq return donors_rq + acceptors_rq - -def balance(xenfree, domdict): - total_memneeded = 0 + + +#redistribute memory across domains +#called when one of domains update its 'meminfo' xenstore key +#return the list of (domain, memory_target) pairs to be passed to +#"xm memset" equivalent +def balance(xen_free_memory, domain_dictionary): + +#sum of all memory requirements - in other words, the difference between +#memory required to be added to domains (acceptors) to make them be at their +#preferred memory, and memory that can be taken from domains (donors) that +#can provide memory. So, it can be negative when plenty of memory. + total_memory_needed = 0 + +#sum of memory preferences of all domains total_mem_pref = 0 + +#sum of memory preferences of all domains that require more memory total_mem_pref_acceptors = 0 - donors = list() - acceptors = list() + donors = list() # domains that can yield memory + acceptors = list() # domains that require more memory #pass 1: compute the above "total" values - for i in domdict.keys(): - if domdict[i].meminfo is None: + for i in domain_dictionary.keys(): + if domain_dictionary[i].meminfo is None: continue - need = memneeded(domdict[i]) -# print 'domain' , i, 'act/pref', domdict[i].memory_actual, prefmem(domdict[i]), 'need=', need + need = memory_needed(domain_dictionary[i]) +# print 'domain' , i, 'act/pref', domain_dictionary[i].memory_actual, prefmem(domain_dictionary[i]), 'need=', need if need < 0: donors.append(i) else: acceptors.append(i) - total_mem_pref_acceptors += prefmem(domdict[i]) - total_memneeded += need - total_mem_pref += prefmem(domdict[i]) + total_mem_pref_acceptors += prefmem(domain_dictionary[i]) + total_memory_needed += need + total_mem_pref += prefmem(domain_dictionary[i]) - totalsum = xenfree - total_memneeded - if totalsum > 0: - return balance_when_enough_memory(domdict, xenfree, total_mem_pref, totalsum) + total_available_memory = xen_free_memory - total_memory_needed + if total_available_memory > 0: + return balance_when_enough_memory(domain_dictionary, xen_free_memory, total_mem_pref, total_available_memory) else: - return balance_when_low_on_memory(domdict, xenfree, total_mem_pref_acceptors, donors, acceptors) + return balance_when_low_on_memory(domain_dictionary, xen_free_memory, total_mem_pref_acceptors, donors, acceptors) diff --git a/dom0/qmemman/qmemman_server.py b/dom0/qmemman/qmemman_server.py index 929aa93b..7dcc0325 100755 --- a/dom0/qmemman/qmemman_server.py +++ b/dom0/qmemman/qmemman_server.py @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ def only_in_first_list(l1, l2): ret.append(i) return ret -def get_req_node(domain_id): +def get_domain_meminfo_key(domain_id): return '/local/domain/'+domain_id+'/memory/meminfo' @@ -29,27 +29,29 @@ class WatchType: class XS_Watcher: def __init__(self): self.handle = xen.lowlevel.xs.xs() - self.handle.watch('/vm', WatchType(XS_Watcher.dom_list_change, None)) + self.handle.watch('/vm', WatchType(XS_Watcher.domain_list_changed, None)) self.watch_token_dict = {} - def dom_list_change(self, param): + def domain_list_changed(self, param): curr = self.handle.ls('', '/local/domain') if curr == None: return global_lock.acquire() for i in only_in_first_list(curr, self.watch_token_dict.keys()): - watch = WatchType(XS_Watcher.request, i) +#new domain has been created + watch = WatchType(XS_Watcher.meminfo_changed, i) self.watch_token_dict[i] = watch - self.handle.watch(get_req_node(i), watch) + self.handle.watch(get_domain_meminfo_key(i), watch) system_state.add_domain(i) for i in only_in_first_list(self.watch_token_dict.keys(), curr): - self.handle.unwatch(get_req_node(i), self.watch_token_dict[i]) +#domain destroyed + self.handle.unwatch(get_domain_meminfo_key(i), self.watch_token_dict[i]) self.watch_token_dict.pop(i) system_state.del_domain(i) global_lock.release() - def request(self, domain_id): - untrusted_meminfo_key = self.handle.read('', get_req_node(domain_id)) + def meminfo_changed(self, domain_id): + untrusted_meminfo_key = self.handle.read('', get_domain_meminfo_key(domain_id)) if untrusted_meminfo_key == None or untrusted_meminfo_key == '': return global_lock.acquire() From 7294f8f3459825a233dcc454038bb62ef1322694 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Rafal Wojtczuk Date: Mon, 9 May 2011 11:02:40 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 7/8] qfile-unpacker: prefix all variables with untrusted_ --- appvm/unpack.c | 74 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------- 1 file changed, 41 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-) diff --git a/appvm/unpack.c b/appvm/unpack.c index eaa1744c..1c887713 100644 --- a/appvm/unpack.c +++ b/appvm/unpack.c @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ #include #include "filecopy.h" -char namebuf[MAX_PATH_LENGTH]; +char untrusted_namebuf[MAX_PATH_LENGTH]; void notify_progress(int p1, int p2) { } @@ -22,28 +22,30 @@ void do_exit(int code) } -void fix_times_and_perms(struct file_header *hdr, char *name) +void fix_times_and_perms(struct file_header *untrusted_hdr, + char *untrusted_name) { struct timeval times[2] = - { {hdr->atime, hdr->atime_nsec / 1000}, {hdr->mtime, - hdr->mtime_nsec / 1000} + { {untrusted_hdr->atime, untrusted_hdr->atime_nsec / 1000}, + {untrusted_hdr->mtime, + untrusted_hdr->mtime_nsec / 1000} }; - if (chmod(name, hdr->mode & 07777)) + if (chmod(untrusted_name, untrusted_hdr->mode & 07777)) /* safe because of chroot */ do_exit(errno); - if (utimes(name, times)) + if (utimes(untrusted_name, times)) /* as above */ do_exit(errno); } -void process_one_file_reg(struct file_header *hdr, char *name) +void process_one_file_reg(struct file_header *untrusted_hdr, + char *untrusted_name) { int ret; - int fdout = - open(name, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_EXCL | O_NOFOLLOW, 0700); + int fdout = open(untrusted_name, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_EXCL | O_NOFOLLOW, 0700); /* safe because of chroot */ if (fdout < 0) do_exit(errno); - ret = copy_file(fdout, 0, hdr->filelen); + ret = copy_file(fdout, 0, untrusted_hdr->filelen); if (ret != COPY_FILE_OK) { if (ret == COPY_FILE_READ_EOF || ret == COPY_FILE_READ_ERROR) @@ -52,47 +54,53 @@ void process_one_file_reg(struct file_header *hdr, char *name) do_exit(errno); } close(fdout); - fix_times_and_perms(hdr, name); + fix_times_and_perms(untrusted_hdr, untrusted_name); } -void process_one_file_dir(struct file_header *hdr, char *name) +void process_one_file_dir(struct file_header *untrusted_hdr, + char *untrusted_name) { // fix perms only when the directory is sent for the second time // it allows to transfer r.x directory contents, as we create it rwx initially - if (!mkdir(name, 0700)) + if (!mkdir(untrusted_name, 0700)) /* safe because of chroot */ return; if (errno != EEXIST) do_exit(errno); - fix_times_and_perms(hdr, name); + fix_times_and_perms(untrusted_hdr, untrusted_name); } -void process_one_file_link(struct file_header *hdr, char *name) +void process_one_file_link(struct file_header *untrusted_hdr, + char *untrusted_name) { - char content[MAX_PATH_LENGTH]; - if (hdr->filelen > MAX_PATH_LENGTH - 1) + char untrusted_content[MAX_PATH_LENGTH]; + unsigned int filelen; + if (untrusted_hdr->filelen > MAX_PATH_LENGTH - 1) do_exit(ENAMETOOLONG); - if (!read_all(0, content, hdr->filelen)) + filelen = untrusted_hdr->filelen; /* sanitized above */ + if (!read_all(0, untrusted_content, filelen)) do_exit(LEGAL_EOF); // hopefully remote has produced error message - content[hdr->filelen] = 0; - if (symlink(content, name)) + untrusted_content[filelen] = 0; + if (symlink(untrusted_content, untrusted_name)) /* safe because of chroot */ do_exit(errno); } -void process_one_file(struct file_header *hdr) +void process_one_file(struct file_header *untrusted_hdr) { - if (hdr->namelen > MAX_PATH_LENGTH - 1) + unsigned int namelen; + if (untrusted_hdr->namelen > MAX_PATH_LENGTH - 1) do_exit(ENAMETOOLONG); - if (!read_all(0, namebuf, hdr->namelen)) + namelen = untrusted_hdr->namelen; /* sanitized above */ + if (!read_all(0, untrusted_namebuf, namelen)) do_exit(LEGAL_EOF); // hopefully remote has produced error message - namebuf[hdr->namelen] = 0; - if (S_ISREG(hdr->mode)) - process_one_file_reg(hdr, namebuf); - else if (S_ISLNK(hdr->mode)) - process_one_file_link(hdr, namebuf); - else if (S_ISDIR(hdr->mode)) - process_one_file_dir(hdr, namebuf); + untrusted_namebuf[namelen] = 0; + if (S_ISREG(untrusted_hdr->mode)) + process_one_file_reg(untrusted_hdr, untrusted_namebuf); + else if (S_ISLNK(untrusted_hdr->mode)) + process_one_file_link(untrusted_hdr, untrusted_namebuf); + else if (S_ISDIR(untrusted_hdr->mode)) + process_one_file_dir(untrusted_hdr, untrusted_namebuf); else do_exit(EINVAL); } @@ -100,9 +108,9 @@ void process_one_file(struct file_header *hdr) void do_unpack(int fd) { global_status_fd = fd; - struct file_header hdr; - while (read_all(0, &hdr, sizeof hdr)) - process_one_file(&hdr); + struct file_header untrusted_hdr; + while (read_all(0, &untrusted_hdr, sizeof untrusted_hdr)) + process_one_file(&untrusted_hdr); if (errno) do_exit(errno); else From 8733c0ef77ecc7e80390009d3fe2dc5b7b448aae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Rafal Wojtczuk Date: Mon, 9 May 2011 13:31:38 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 8/8] qrexec_daemon: fixed typo in msg name --- qrexec/qrexec_daemon.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/qrexec/qrexec_daemon.c b/qrexec/qrexec_daemon.c index 69e81797..22a163e1 100644 --- a/qrexec/qrexec_daemon.c +++ b/qrexec/qrexec_daemon.c @@ -410,7 +410,7 @@ void sanitize_message_from_agent(struct server_header *untrusted_header) } break; case MSG_AGENT_TO_SERVER_STDOUT: - case MSG_SERVER_TO_CLIENT_STDERR: + case MSG_AGENT_TO_SERVER_STDERR: case MSG_AGENT_TO_SERVER_EXIT_CODE: check_client_id_in_range(untrusted_header->client_id); if (untrusted_header->len > MAX_DATA_CHUNK