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+## Note that policy parsing stops at the first match,
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+## so adding anything below "$anyvm $anyvm action" line will have no effect
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+
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+## Please use a single # to start your custom comments
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+
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+$anyvm $dispvm allow
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+$anyvm $anyvm deny
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+
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+# WARNING: The qubes.VMExec service is dangerous and there are really few
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+# cases when it could be safely used. Especially when policy set to "ask" you
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+# have no way to know for sure what command(s) will be called. Compromissed
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+# source VM can substitute the command. Allowing one VM to execute
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+# qubes.VMExec over the other VM allows the former to TAKE FULL CONTROL over
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+# the later. In most cases this is not what we want!
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+#
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+# Instead we should be using task-specific qrexec services which provide
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+# assurance as to what program will be responding to the (untrusted) VM
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+# requests.
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+#
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+# It is, however, safe, in most cases, to allow ultimate control of the
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+# creating AppVM over the DisposableVM it creates as part of the qrexec service
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+# invocation. That's why by default we have "$anyvm $dispvm allow" rule. Note
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+# that it does _not_ allow any AppVM to execute qubes.VMExec service over any
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+# DispVM created in the system -- that would obviously be wrong. It only allows
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+# qubes.VMExec service access to the AppVM which creates the DispVM as part of
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+# this very service invocation.
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+#
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+# See e.g. this thread for some discussion:
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+# https://groups.google.com/d/msg/qubes-users/xnAByaL_bjI/3PjYdiTDW-0J
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+#
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+#
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Pawel Marczewski