qubes.VMShell.policy: use 'deny' rule by default when target is a regular AppVM
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## Please use a single # to start your custom comments
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$anyvm $dispvm allow
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$anyvm $anyvm ask
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$anyvm $anyvm deny
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# WARNING: The qubes.VMShell service is dangerous and there are really few
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# cases when it could be safely used. Allowing one VM to execute qubes.VMShell
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# over the other VM allows the former to TAKE FULL CONTROL over the later. In
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# most cases this is not what we want!
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#
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# Instead we should be using task-specific qrexec services which provide
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# assurance as to what program will be responding to the (untrusted) VM
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# requests.
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#
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# It is, however, safe, in most cases, to allow ultimate control of the
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# creating AppVM over the DisposableVM it creates as part of the qrexec service
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# invocation. That's why by default we have "$anyvm $dispvm allow" rule. Note
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# that it does _not_ allow any AppVM to execute qubes.VMShell service over any
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# DispVM created in the system -- that would obviously be wrong. It only allows
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# qubes.VMShell service access to the AppVM which creates the DispVM as part of
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# this very service invocation.
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#
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# See e.g. this thread for some discussion:
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# https://groups.google.com/d/msg/qubes-users/xnAByaL_bjI/3PjYdiTDW-0J
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#
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#
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