This helps hiding VM IP for anonymous VMs (Whonix) even when some
application leak it. VM will know only some fake IP, which should be set
to something as common as possible.
The feature is mostly implemented at (Proxy)VM side using NAT in
separate network namespace. Core here is only passing arguments to it.
It is designed the way that multiple VMs can use the same IP and still
do not interfere with each other. Even more: it is possible to address
each of them (using their "native" IP), even when multiple of them share
the same "fake" IP.
Original approach (marmarek/old-qubes-core-admin#2) used network script
arguments by appending them to script name, but libxl in Xen >= 4.6
fixed that side effect and it isn't possible anymore. So use QubesDB
instead.
From user POV, this adds 3 "features":
- net/fake-ip - IP address visible in the VM
- net/fake-gateway - default gateway in the VM
- net/fake-netmask - network mask
The feature is enabled if net/fake-ip is set (to some IP address) and is
different than VM native IP. All of those "features" can be set on
template, to affect all of VMs.
Firewall rules etc in (Proxy)VM should still be applied to VM "native"
IP.
FixesQubesOS/qubes-issues#1143
Instead of excerpt from /proc/meminfo, use just one integer. This make
qmemman handling much easier and ease implementation for non-Linux OSes
(where /proc/meminfo doesn't exist).
For now keep also support for old format.
FixesQubesOS/qubes-issues#1312
There is no point in changing *public API* for just a change without any
better reason. It turned out most of those settings will be the same in
Qubes 4.0, so keep names the same.
This reverts commit 2d6ad3b60c.
QubesOS/qubes-issues#1812
This is migration of core2 commits:
commit d0ba43f253
Author: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>
Date: Mon Jun 6 02:21:08 2016 +0200
core: start guid as normal user even when VM started by root
Another attempt to avoid permissions-related problems...
QubesOS/qubes-issues#1768
commit 89d002a031
Author: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>
Date: Mon Jun 6 02:19:51 2016 +0200
core: use runuser instead of sudo for switching root->user
There are problems with using sudo in early system startup
(systemd-logind not running yet, pam_systemd timeouts). Since we don't
need full session here, runuser is good enough (even better: faster).
commit 2265fd3d52
Author: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>
Date: Sat Jun 4 17:42:24 2016 +0200
core: start qubesdb as normal user, even when VM is started by root
On VM start, old qubesdb-daemon is terminated (if still running). In
practice it happen only at VM startart (shutdown and quickly start
again). But in that case, if the VM was started by root, such operation
would fail.
So when VM is started by root, make sure that qubesdb-daemon will be
running as normal user (the first user in group 'qubes' - there should
be only one).
FixesQubesOS/qubes-issues#1745
Implement required event handlers according to documentation in
qubes.devices.
A modification of qubes.devices.DeviceInfo is needed to allow dynamic,
read-only properties.
QubesOS/qubes-issues#2257
Allow device plugin to list attached and available devices. Enforce
at API level every device being exposed by some domain.
This commit only changes devices API, but not update existing users
(pci) yet.
QubesOS/qubes-issues#2257
- fix assigning 'template' property - do not do it if VM already have it
set
- cap default maxmem at 4000, as we clamp it to 10*memory anyway (and
default memory is 400)
This directory is not only for disk images (in fact disk images may be
elsewhere depending on choosen volume pool), so it would be cleaner to
handle (create/remove) it directly in QubesVM class.
