Resolve:
- no-else-return
- useless-object-inheritance
- useless-return
- consider-using-set-comprehension
- consider-using-in
- logging-not-lazy
Ignore:
- not-an-iterable - false possitives for asyncio coroutines
Ignore all the above in qubespolicy/__init__.py, as the file will be
moved to separate repository (core-qrexec) - it already has a copy
there, don't desynchronize them.
Translate empty target to '@default' keyword earlier, so that
original_target will report '@default' instead of ''. The latter is
rejected by qubes-rpc-multiplexer when the call is directed to dom0,
because it expects to get non-empty arguments about original
target.
Using '$' is easy to misuse in shell scripts, shell commands etc. After
all this years, lets abandon this dangerous character and move to
something safer: '@'. The choice was made after reviewing specifications
of various shells on different operating systems and this is the
character that have no special meaning in none of them.
To preserve compatibility, automatically translate '$' to '@' when
loading policy files.
Provide original target as two arguments: type, value
This will ease handling special keywords without risking hitting shell
special characters or other problems.
Rely on qrexec-client resolving QUBESRPC keyword, same as in case of VM
call. This will allow applying special treatment to such calls, like
calling qubes-rpc-multiplexer directly (avoiding shell), because we have
defined protocol what can be used here.
All policy keywords needs to be expanded before sending it to
confirmation dialog. $dispvm was already handled, but $adminvm was
missing
FixesQubesOS/qubes-issues#3283
This will make analyzing the policy code slightly easier. While it makes
verify_special_value function more complex, other places are much
simpler now.
'dispvm_allowed' name was confusing, because it suggested being able to
spawn new DispVMs, not being a template for DispVM.
FixesQubesOS/qubes-issues#3047
Those were registered in the parser, but ignored otherwise. The main
(and only?) purpose of them is to evaluate policy when pasting some text
between domains.
FixesQubesOS/qubes-issues#2985
Add public Admin API call to create Disposable VM that would be
automatically destroyed after shutdown. Do not keep this functionality
for qrexec-policy tool only.
Also, use admin.vm.Start there, instead of internal.vm.Start and
admin.vm.Kill instead of internal.vm.CleanupDispVM (this is enough,
because DispVM now have auto_cleanup property).
QubesOS/qubes-issues#2974
Build icons dictionary from all provided icons, not only those allowed
as target. Specifically, source may not be allowed target (but the
window need its icon).
When rule does not specify forced target (`target=...`), generic
`$dispvm` wasn't resolved to specific Disposable VM (based on
`default_dispvm` property).
This way it will work independently from where qrexec-policy tool will
be called (in most cases - from a system service, as root).
This is also very similar architecture to what we'll need when moving to
GUI domain - there GUI part will also be separated from policy
evaluation logic.
QubesOS/qubes-issues#910
- drop qid usage - it isn't really needed, especially for to-be-created
DispVMs
- use "domains_info" dict as input, instead of loading qubes.xml
directly
- nicely format "Disposable VM" entries
- simplify whitelist/blacklist handling - since qrexecpolicy always
provide a list of allowed choices, use just that
Important note: there are two names concepts:
1. Display name - name of VM, or in case of to-be-created DispVMs - a
string "Disposable VM (name-of-base-vm)"
2. API name - as in qrexec policy - $dispvm:name-of-base-vm for new
DispVMs
Externally at API level (allowed targets list, return value), API name
is used, but internally VMListModeler._entries is still indexed with
display names. This is done for more efficient (and readable) GUI
handling - because most of the time it's searched for what user have
entered.
QubesOS/qubes-issues#910
Import unmodified implementation done by @boring-stuff.
Full history for reference is available in rpc-confirmation-window
branch.
QubesOS/qubes-issues#910
This socket (and commands) are not exposed to untrusted input, so no
need to extensive sanitization. Also, there is no need to provide a
stable API here, as those methods are used internally only.
QubesOS/qubes-issues#853
