qubes.sudoers 1.3 KB

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  1. %qubes ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL
  2. #
  3. # What we're saying above basically means: if the attacker got user access in
  4. # Dom0, then you're screwed already, as there are dozens of ways for the
  5. # attacker to escalate to root from user (e.g. via xend).
  6. #
  7. # Even that is not necessary, in fact! As all the VM control actions can be
  8. # done by user -- after all this is why you can easily start/create VMs and
  9. # apps in VMs from GUI -- all that the attacker needs is user access in Dom0.
  10. #
  11. # So, because in Qubes OS, in Dom0, user account is just as sensitive as root
  12. # account, we don't pretend otherwise, and try to make life a bit easier for
  13. # the user allowing for easy escalation (no need to choose and remember a root
  14. # password in Dom0).
  15. #
  16. # This is also why we don't pretend that Qubes OS is a multiuser system -- it
  17. # is not! (for the reasons given above). The assumption is that there is only
  18. # one user that logs into GUI manager: YOU. This is hardly a limiting factor
  19. # these days, when it's not uncommon for a single person to own not one, but
  20. # several computers, which are not shared with others (phone, tablet, laptops).
  21. # We live in a PC-era! :)
  22. #
  23. # This means that the user password you choose during installation servers only
  24. # one purpose: it allows you to lock your screen while you're away via the
  25. # screen saver. Nothing more!
  26. #
  27. # joanna.
  28. #
  29. Defaults !requiretty