From 0f410ed2de0c4c36997d607135b8f8a80ae86bfd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: erihe251 Date: Mon, 19 Oct 2015 21:52:41 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] Small language fixes --- misc/qubes.sudoers | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/misc/qubes.sudoers b/misc/qubes.sudoers index b3b1307..43ca153 100644 --- a/misc/qubes.sudoers +++ b/misc/qubes.sudoers @@ -25,11 +25,11 @@ user ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL # and for sure, root/user isolation is not a mitigating factor. # # Because, really, if somebody could find and exploit a bug in the Xen -# hypervisor -- so far there have been only one (!) publicly disclosed +# hypervisor -- so far there has been only one (!) publicly disclosed # exploitable bug in the Xen hypervisor from a VM, found in 2008, # incidentally by one of the Qubes developers (RW) -- then it would be -# highly unlikely if that person couldn't also found a user-to-root -# escalation in VM (which as we know from history of UNIX/Linux +# highly unlikely that they couldn't also find a user-to-root +# escalation in the VM (which as we know from history of UNIX/Linux # happens all the time). # # At the same time allowing for easy user-to-root escalation in a VM