From cc7d3fc9250ca8da9e23a96f54e87c065b07db62 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andrew David Wong Date: Sun, 4 Dec 2016 16:21:46 -0800 Subject: [PATCH] Update Xen bug count in sudoers comment Closes QubesOS/qubes-issues#2480 --- misc/qubes.sudoers | 5 ++--- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/misc/qubes.sudoers b/misc/qubes.sudoers index fd43b75..9f6308f 100644 --- a/misc/qubes.sudoers +++ b/misc/qubes.sudoers @@ -25,9 +25,8 @@ user ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL # and for sure, root/user isolation is not a mitigating factor. # # Because, really, if somebody could find and exploit a bug in the Xen -# hypervisor -- so far there has been only one (!) publicly disclosed -# exploitable bug in the Xen hypervisor from a VM, found in 2008, -# incidentally by one of the Qubes developers (RW) -- then it would be +# hypervisor -- as of 2016, there have been only three publicly disclosed +# exploitable bugs in the Xen hypervisor from a VM -- then it would be # highly unlikely that that person couldn't also find a user-to-root # escalation in the VM (which as we know from history of UNIX/Linux # happens all the time).