core-agent-linux/misc/qubes.sudoers

Defaults !requiretty
user ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL

# WTF?! Have you lost your mind?!
#
# In Qubes VMs there is no point in isolating the root account from
# the user account. This is because all the user data are already
# accessible from the user account, so there is no direct benefit for
# the attacker if she could escalate to root (there is even no benefit
# in trying to install some persistent rootkits, as the VM's root
# filesystem modifications are lost upon each start of a VM).
#
# One might argue that some hypothetical attacks against the
# hypervisor or the few daemons/backends in Dom0 (so VM escape
# attacks) most likely would require root access in the VM to trigger
# the attack.
#
# That's true, but mere existence of such a bug in the hypervisor or
# Dom0 that could be exploited by a malicious VM, no matter whether
# requiring user, root, or even kernel access in the VM, would be
# FATAL. In such situation (if there was such a bug in Xen) there
# really is no comforting that: "oh, but the mitigating factor was
# that the attacker needed root in VM!" We're not M$, and we're not
# gonna BS our users that there are mitigating factors in that case,
# and for sure, root/user isolation is not a mitigating factor.
#
# Because, really, if somebody could find and exploit a bug in the Xen
# hypervisor -- as of 2016, there have been only three publicly disclosed
# exploitable bugs in the Xen hypervisor from a VM -- then it would be
# highly unlikely that that person couldn't also find a user-to-root
# escalation in the VM (which as we know from history of UNIX/Linux
# happens all the time).
#
# At the same time allowing for easy user-to-root escalation in a VM
# is simply convenient for users, especially for update installation.
#
# Currently this still doesn't work as expected, because some idotic
# piece of software called PolKit uses own set of policies. We're
# planning to address this in Beta 2. (Why PolKit is an idiocy? Do a
# simple experiment: start 'xinput test' in one xterm, running as
# user, then open some app that uses PolKit and asks for root
# password, e.g.  gpk-update-viewer -- observe how all the keystrokes
# with root password you enter into the "secure" PolKit dialog box can
# be seen by the xinput program...)
#
# joanna.

# vim: ft=sudoers