Qubes/core-agent-linux
1
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Pull Requests Releases Wiki Activity

Update Xen bug count in sudoers comment

Browse Source 
Closes QubesOS/qubes-issues#2480
This commit is contained in:
Andrew David Wong 2016-12-04 16:21:46 -08:00
parent fb8c356216
commit cc7d3fc925
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG Key ID: DB4DD3BC39503030
1 changed files with 2 additions and 3 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

5
misc/qubes.sudoers
View File

@ -25,9 +25,8 @@ user ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL
# and for sure, root/user isolation is not a mitigating factor.
#
# Because, really, if somebody could find and exploit a bug in the Xen
# hypervisor -- so far there has been only one (!) publicly disclosed
# exploitable bug in the Xen hypervisor from a VM, found in 2008,
# incidentally by one of the Qubes developers (RW) -- then it would be
# hypervisor -- as of 2016, there have been only three publicly disclosed
# exploitable bugs in the Xen hypervisor from a VM -- then it would be
# highly unlikely that that person couldn't also find a user-to-root
# escalation in the VM (which as we know from history of UNIX/Linux
# happens all the time).