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Update Xen bug count in sudoers comment

Closes QubesOS/qubes-issues#2480
Andrew David Wong %!s(int64=7) %!d(string=hai) anos
pai
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cc7d3fc925
Modificáronse 1 ficheiros con 2 adicións e 3 borrados
  1. 2 3
      misc/qubes.sudoers

+ 2 - 3
misc/qubes.sudoers

@@ -25,9 +25,8 @@ user ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL
 # and for sure, root/user isolation is not a mitigating factor.
 #
 # Because, really, if somebody could find and exploit a bug in the Xen
-# hypervisor -- so far there has been only one (!) publicly disclosed
-# exploitable bug in the Xen hypervisor from a VM, found in 2008,
-# incidentally by one of the Qubes developers (RW) -- then it would be
+# hypervisor -- as of 2016, there have been only three publicly disclosed
+# exploitable bugs in the Xen hypervisor from a VM -- then it would be
 # highly unlikely that that person couldn't also find a user-to-root
 # escalation in the VM (which as we know from history of UNIX/Linux
 # happens all the time).