49 regels
2.2 KiB
Plaintext
49 regels
2.2 KiB
Plaintext
Defaults !requiretty
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user ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL
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# WTF?! Have you lost your mind?!
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#
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# In Qubes VMs there is no point in isolating the root account from
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# the user account. This is because all the user data are already
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# accessible from the user account, so there is no direct benefit for
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# the attacker if she could escalate to root (there is even no benefit
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# in trying to install some persistent rootkits, as the VM's root
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# filesystem modifications are lost upon each start of a VM).
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#
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# One might argue that some hypothetical attacks against the
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# hypervisor or the few daemons/backends in Dom0 (so VM escape
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# attacks) most likely would require root access in the VM to trigger
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# the attack.
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#
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# That's true, but mere existence of such a bug in the hypervisor or
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# Dom0 that could be exploited by a malicious VM, no matter whether
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# requiring user, root, or even kernel access in the VM, would be
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# FATAL. In such situation (if there was such a bug in Xen) there
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# really is no comforting that: "oh, but the mitigating factor was
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# that the attacker needed root in VM!" We're not M$, and we're not
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# gonna BS our users that there are mitigating factors in that case,
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# and for sure, root/user isolation is not a mitigating factor.
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#
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# Because, really, if somebody could find and exploit a bug in the Xen
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# hypervisor -- as of 2016, there have been only three publicly disclosed
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# exploitable bugs in the Xen hypervisor from a VM -- then it would be
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# highly unlikely that that person couldn't also find a user-to-root
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# escalation in the VM (which as we know from history of UNIX/Linux
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# happens all the time).
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#
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# At the same time allowing for easy user-to-root escalation in a VM
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# is simply convenient for users, especially for update installation.
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#
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# Currently this still doesn't work as expected, because some idotic
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# piece of software called PolKit uses own set of policies. We're
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# planning to address this in Beta 2. (Why PolKit is an idiocy? Do a
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# simple experiment: start 'xinput test' in one xterm, running as
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# user, then open some app that uses PolKit and asks for root
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# password, e.g. gpk-update-viewer -- observe how all the keystrokes
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# with root password you enter into the "secure" PolKit dialog box can
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# be seen by the xinput program...)
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#
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# joanna.
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# vim: ft=sudoers
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