Install files in /etc/qubes-rpc for all methods defined in API
documentation, even if not yet implemented (qubesd will handle it
raising appropriate exception).
Use minimal program written in C (qubesd-query-fast), instead of
qubesd-query in python for performance reasons:
- a single qubesd-query run: ~300ms
- equivalent in shell (echo | nc -U): ~40ms
- qubesd-query-fast: ~20ms
Many tools makes multiple API calls, so performance here do matter. For
example qvm-ls (from VM) currently takes about 60s on a system with 24
VMs.
Also make use of `$include:` directive in policy file, to make it easier
defining a VM with full Admin API access.
QubesOS/qubes-issues#853
This service currently does more harm (desync libvirt state with
reality) than good. Since we have qubesd, we may come back to
implementing it properly using libvirt events.
It doesn't really make sense to keep man pages in separate package.
Previously it was done to avoid some build dependencies (pandoc require
a lot of them), but it isn't a problem anymore.
This all either have been migrated to core3, or is not needed anymore.
There is still qvm-tools directory with a few tools that needs to be
migrated, or installed as is.
qvm-ls tool (as all other tools) will be accessing properties through
API, so no need (nor sense) for this tool-specific attributes in
qubes.property. The only somehow used was ls_width, and in fact it made
the output unnecessary wide.
The tool itself is already moved to core-mgmt-client repository.
QubesOS/qubes-issues#853
This way it will work independently from where qrexec-policy tool will
be called (in most cases - from a system service, as root).
This is also very similar architecture to what we'll need when moving to
GUI domain - there GUI part will also be separated from policy
evaluation logic.
QubesOS/qubes-issues#910
This socket (and commands) are not exposed to untrusted input, so no
need to extensive sanitization. Also, there is no need to provide a
stable API here, as those methods are used internally only.
QubesOS/qubes-issues#853
This is rewritten version of core-admin-linux/qrexec/qrexec-policy.
It's placed outside of `qubes` module on purpose - to avoid imporing it,
which require a lot of time.
QubesOS/qubes-issues#865QubesOS/qubes-issues#910
This reverts commit 0f1672dc63.
Bring it back. Lets not revert the whole feature just because required
package exists only in qubes-builder, not in some online repository.
Also, this revert didn't go as planned - there was a reference to a
'passphrase' local variable, but it wasn't assigned any value.
Cc: @woju
This is intended to call to finish template installation/removal.
Template RPM package is basically container for root.img, nothing more.
Other parts needs to be generated after root.img extraction. Previously
it was open coded in rpm post-install script, but lets keep it as qvm
tool to ease supporting multiple version in template builder
QubesOS/qubes-issues#2412
The wrapper doesn't do anything else than translating command
parameters, but it's load time is significant (because of python imports
mostly). Since we can't use python lvm API from non-root user anyway,
lets drop the wrapper and call `lvm` directly (or through sudo when
necessary).
This makes VM startup much faster - storage preparation is down from
over 10s to about 3s.
QubesOS/qubes-issues#2256
`openssl dgst` and `openssl enc` used previously poorly handle key
stretching - in case of `openssl enc` encryption key is derived using
single MD5 iteration, without even any salt. This hardly prevent
brute force or even rainbow tables attacks. To make things worse, the
same key is used for encryption and integrity protection which ease
brute force even further.
All this is still about brute force attacks, so when using long, high
entropy passphrase, it should be still relatively safe. But lets do
better.
According to discussion in QubesOS/qubes-issues#971, scrypt algorithm is
a good choice for key stretching (it isn't the best of all existing, but
a good one and widely adopted). At the same time, lets switch away from
`openssl` tool, as it is very limited and apparently not designed for
production use. Use `scrypt` tool, which is very simple and does exactly
what we need - encrypt the data and integrity protect it. Its archive
format have own (simple) header with data required by the `scrypt`
algorithm, including salt. Internally data is encrypted with AES256-CTR
and integrity protected with HMAC-SHA256. For details see:
https://github.com/tarsnap/scrypt/blob/master/FORMAT
This means change of backup format. Mainly:
1. HMAC is stored in scrypt header, so don't use separate file for it.
Instead have data in files with `.enc` extension.
2. For compatibility leave `backup-header` and `backup-header.hmac`. But
`backup-header.hmac` is really scrypt-encrypted version of `backup-header`.
3. For each file, prepend its identifier to the passphrase, to
authenticate filename itself too. Having this we can guard against
reordering archive files within a single backup and across backups. This
identifier is built as:
backup ID (from backup-header)!filename!
For backup-header itself, there is no backup ID (just 'backup-header!').
FixesQubesOS/qubes-issues#971
tar can't write archive with _contents_ of block device. We need this to
backup LVM-based disk images. To avoid dumping image to a file first,
create a simple tar archiver just for this purpose.
Python is not the fastest possible technology, it's 3 times slower than
equivalent written in C. But it's much easier to read, much less
error-prone, and still process 1GB image under 1s (CPU time, leaving
along actual disk reads). So, it's acceptable.
First part - handling firewall.xml and rules formatting.
Specification on https://qubes-os.org/doc/vm-interface/
TODO (for dom0):
- plug into QubesVM object
- expose rules in QubesDB (including reloading)
- drop old functions (vm.get_firewall_conf etc)
QubesOS/qubes-issues#1815
