This socket (and commands) are not exposed to untrusted input, so no
need to extensive sanitization. Also, there is no need to provide a
stable API here, as those methods are used internally only.
QubesOS/qubes-issues#853
This is rewritten version of core-admin-linux/qrexec/qrexec-policy.
It's placed outside of `qubes` module on purpose - to avoid imporing it,
which require a lot of time.
QubesOS/qubes-issues#865QubesOS/qubes-issues#910
This reverts commit 0f1672dc63.
Bring it back. Lets not revert the whole feature just because required
package exists only in qubes-builder, not in some online repository.
Also, this revert didn't go as planned - there was a reference to a
'passphrase' local variable, but it wasn't assigned any value.
Cc: @woju
This is intended to call to finish template installation/removal.
Template RPM package is basically container for root.img, nothing more.
Other parts needs to be generated after root.img extraction. Previously
it was open coded in rpm post-install script, but lets keep it as qvm
tool to ease supporting multiple version in template builder
QubesOS/qubes-issues#2412
The wrapper doesn't do anything else than translating command
parameters, but it's load time is significant (because of python imports
mostly). Since we can't use python lvm API from non-root user anyway,
lets drop the wrapper and call `lvm` directly (or through sudo when
necessary).
This makes VM startup much faster - storage preparation is down from
over 10s to about 3s.
QubesOS/qubes-issues#2256
`openssl dgst` and `openssl enc` used previously poorly handle key
stretching - in case of `openssl enc` encryption key is derived using
single MD5 iteration, without even any salt. This hardly prevent
brute force or even rainbow tables attacks. To make things worse, the
same key is used for encryption and integrity protection which ease
brute force even further.
All this is still about brute force attacks, so when using long, high
entropy passphrase, it should be still relatively safe. But lets do
better.
According to discussion in QubesOS/qubes-issues#971, scrypt algorithm is
a good choice for key stretching (it isn't the best of all existing, but
a good one and widely adopted). At the same time, lets switch away from
`openssl` tool, as it is very limited and apparently not designed for
production use. Use `scrypt` tool, which is very simple and does exactly
what we need - encrypt the data and integrity protect it. Its archive
format have own (simple) header with data required by the `scrypt`
algorithm, including salt. Internally data is encrypted with AES256-CTR
and integrity protected with HMAC-SHA256. For details see:
https://github.com/tarsnap/scrypt/blob/master/FORMAT
This means change of backup format. Mainly:
1. HMAC is stored in scrypt header, so don't use separate file for it.
Instead have data in files with `.enc` extension.
2. For compatibility leave `backup-header` and `backup-header.hmac`. But
`backup-header.hmac` is really scrypt-encrypted version of `backup-header`.
3. For each file, prepend its identifier to the passphrase, to
authenticate filename itself too. Having this we can guard against
reordering archive files within a single backup and across backups. This
identifier is built as:
backup ID (from backup-header)!filename!
For backup-header itself, there is no backup ID (just 'backup-header!').
FixesQubesOS/qubes-issues#971
tar can't write archive with _contents_ of block device. We need this to
backup LVM-based disk images. To avoid dumping image to a file first,
create a simple tar archiver just for this purpose.
Python is not the fastest possible technology, it's 3 times slower than
equivalent written in C. But it's much easier to read, much less
error-prone, and still process 1GB image under 1s (CPU time, leaving
along actual disk reads). So, it's acceptable.
First part - handling firewall.xml and rules formatting.
Specification on https://qubes-os.org/doc/vm-interface/
TODO (for dom0):
- plug into QubesVM object
- expose rules in QubesDB (including reloading)
- drop old functions (vm.get_firewall_conf etc)
QubesOS/qubes-issues#1815
Implement required event handlers according to documentation in
qubes.devices.
A modification of qubes.devices.DeviceInfo is needed to allow dynamic,
read-only properties.
QubesOS/qubes-issues#2257
Some tests do not apply, as there is no savefile and attributes
propagation is much simpler. Dropped tests:
- test_000_firewall_propagation
- test_001_firewall_propagation
- test_000_prepare_dvm
QubesOS/qubes-issues#2253
Enable e820_host option for VMs with PCI devices (to allow VM kernel to
deal with address space conflicts). But add a property to allow
disabling it.
FixesQubesOS/qubes-issues#2019
- Use full import paths in qvm-pool
- Add, Remove, Info and List options set `Namespace.command`. This fixes a crash
when `-o dir_path=/mnt/foo` is specified after `-a foo xen`.
- Remove `_List`
- Remove 'added pool' and 'removed pool' messages. Unix tools are quiet
- qvm-pool call app.save()
- Rename create_parser in get_parser
- Rename local_parser variables to just parser
- qvm-pool uses print_table
- Remove old qvm-remove
- Remove a log line from Storage, because it prints confusing lines, like:
Removing volume kernel: /var/lib/qubes/vm-kernels/4.1.13-6/modules.img
This commit eliminates import statements happening in the middle of the
file (between two classes definition). The cycles are still there. The
only magic module is qubes itself.
Leave the 'proper' fix of making this package noarch commented
out for now, to allow this to be merged.
Comments as per the parallel submit to qubes-artwork.
This allows the user to start VM based on "old" system (from R3.x) in
R4.0. For example after restoring from backup, or migration. This also
makes upgrade instruction much easier - no need complex recovery
instruction if one upgrade dom0 before upgrading all the templates.
QubesOS/qubes-issues#1812
The following list is bollocks. There were many, many more.
Conflicts:
core-modules/003QubesTemplateVm.py
core-modules/005QubesNetVm.py
core/qubes.py
core/storage/__init__.py
core/storage/xen.py
doc/qvm-tools/qvm-pci.rst
doc/qvm-tools/qvm-prefs.rst
qubes/tools/qmemmand.py
qvm-tools/qvm-create
qvm-tools/qvm-prefs
qvm-tools/qvm-start
tests/__init__.py
vm-config/xen-vm-template-hvm.xml
This commit took 2 days (26-27.01.2016) and put our friendship to test.
--Wojtek and Marek
This fixes compilation under Fedora. Depending on $PATH order, automagic
dependencies put /usr/bin/python or /bin/python (because we have
anything, becase /bin is just symlink to /usr/bin.
This is part of fixing qvm-start.
qmemman was moved with minimal touching, mainly module names.
Moved function parsing human-readable sizes from core2. This function is
wrong, because it treats k/M/G as 1024-based, but leave it for now.
