This socket (and commands) are not exposed to untrusted input, so no
need to extensive sanitization. Also, there is no need to provide a
stable API here, as those methods are used internally only.
QubesOS/qubes-issues#853
0) All those methods are now awaitable rather than synchronous.
1) The base method is run_service(). The method run() was rewritten
using run_service('qubes.VMShell', input=...). There is no provision
for running plain commands.
2) Get rid of passio*= arguments. If you'd like to get another return
value, use another method. It's as simple as that.
See:
- run_service_for_stdio()
- run_for_stdio()
Also gone are wait= and localcmd= arguments. They are of no use
inside qubesd.
3) The qvm-run tool and tests are left behind for now and will be fixed
later. This is because they also need event loop, which is not
implemented yet.
fixesQubesOS/qubes-issues#1900QubesOS/qubes-issues#2622
- Get rid of @not_in_api, exchange for explicit @api() decorator.
- Old @no_payload decorator becomes an argument (keyword-only).
- Factor out AbstractQubesMgmt class to be a base class for other mgmt
backends.
- Use async def instead of @asyncio.coroutine.
QubesOS/qubes-issues#2622
This also means we don't check if a VM with given name (in case of
VMProperty) exists in the system, at this stage. But this is ok, lets
not duplicate work of property setter.
QubesOS/qubes-issues#2622
If kwargs contains dict as one of values, it isn't hashable and can't be
used as value in frozenset/tuple. Convert such values into
frozenset(dict.items()). Only one (more) level is supported, but it
should be enough.
Solution from http://stackoverflow.com/a/13264725
In theory any call could modify config (through events), but lets keep
writes to qubes.xml low. In any case, qubes.xml will be eventually
written (either at next config-modifying call, or daemon exit).
Sanitization of input value is tricky here, and also very important at
the same time. If property define value type (and it's something more
specific than 'str'), use that. Otherwise allow only printable ASCII
characters, and let appropriate event and setter handle value.
At this point I've reviewed all QubesVM properties in this category and
added appropriate setters where needed.
QubesOS/qubes-issues#2622
Don't allow characters potentially interfering with qrexec. To be on the
safe side, allow only alphanumeric characters + very few selected
punctuations.
Split it into two functions: validate_name - context-less verification,
and actual _setter_name which perform additional verification in
context of actual VM.
Switch to qubes.exc.* exceptions where appropriate.
This reverts commit 0f1672dc63.
Bring it back. Lets not revert the whole feature just because required
package exists only in qubes-builder, not in some online repository.
Also, this revert didn't go as planned - there was a reference to a
'passphrase' local variable, but it wasn't assigned any value.
Cc: @woju
This will allow more flexible API usage, especially when using mgmt API
- we need to use VM type as string there.
We don't lose any flexibility here - VM class names needs to be uniquely
identified by a string (used in qubes.xml) anyway.
Use the right cow image and apply the second layer to provide read-write
access. The correct setup is:
- base image + base cow -> read-only snapshot (base changes "cached"
until committed)
- read-only snapshot + VM cow -> read-write snapshot (changes discarded
after VM shutdown)
This way, even VM without Qubes-specific startup scripts will can
benefit from Template VMs, while VMs with Qubes-specific startup scripts
may still see original root.img content (for possible signature
verification, when storage domain got implemented).
QubesOS/qubes-issues#2256
QubesDB daemon no longer remove socket created by new instance, so one
part of VM restart race condition is solved. The only remaining part is
to ensure that we really connect to the new instance, instead of talking
to the old one (soon to be terminated).
FixesQubesOS/qubes-issues#1694
None of properties set there do any "dangerous thing" for filesystem
permissions (at least for now), so do not require it. This is mostly to
keep compatibility with %post rpm scripts (kernel-qubes-vm at least).
QubesOS/qubes-issues#2412
This tool by design is called as root, so try to:
- switch to normal user if possible
- fix file permissions afterwards - if not
QubesOS/qubes-issues#2412
There was a comment '# Set later', but actually values were never set.
This break adding just installed template (qvm-template-postprocess).
QubesOS/qubes-issues#2412
When system is installed with LVM thin pool, it should be used by
default. But lets keep file-based on for /var/lib/qubes for some corner
cases, migration etc.
QubesOS/qubes-issues#2412
This is intended to call to finish template installation/removal.
Template RPM package is basically container for root.img, nothing more.
Other parts needs to be generated after root.img extraction. Previously
it was open coded in rpm post-install script, but lets keep it as qvm
tool to ease supporting multiple version in template builder
QubesOS/qubes-issues#2412
VM files may be already removed. Don't fail on this while removing a
VM, it's probably the reason why domain is being removed.
qvm-remove tool have its own guard for this, but it isn't enough - if
rmtree(dir_path) fails, storage.remove() would not be called, so
non-file storages would not be cleaned up.
This is also needed to correctly handle template reinstallation - where
VM directory is moved away to call create_on_disk again.
QubesOS/qubes-issues#2412
'-' is invalid character in python identifier, so all the properties
have '_'. But in previous versions qvm-* tools accepted names with '-',
so lets not break this.
QubesOS/qubes-issues#2412
/var/log/qubes directory have setgid set, so all the files will be owned
by qubes group (that's ok), but there is no enforcement of creating it
group writable, which undermine group ownership (logs created by root
would not be writable by normal user)
QubesOS/qubes-issues#2412
In case of LVM (at least), "internal" flag is initialized only when
listing volume attached to given VM, but not when listing them from the
pool. This looks like a limitation (bug?) of pool driver, it looks like
much nicer fix is to handle the flag in qvm-block tool (which list VMs
volumes anyway), than in LVM storage pool driver (which would need to
keep second copy of volumes list - just like file driver).
QubesOS/qubes-issues#2256
There are mutiple cases when snapshots are inconsistently created, for
example:
- "-back" snapshot created from the "new" data, instead of old one
- "-snap" created even when volume.snap_on_start=False
- probably more
Fix this by following volume.snap_on_start and volume.save_on_stop
directly, instead of using abstraction of old volume types.
QubesOS/qubes-issues#2256
Just calling pool.init_volume isn't enough - a lot of code depends on
additional data loaded into vm.storage object. Provide a convenient
wrapper for this.
At the same time, fix loading extra volumes from qubes.xml - don't fail
on volume not mentioned in initial vm.volume_config.
QubesOS/qubes-issues#2256
- add missing lvm remove call when commiting changes
- delay creating volatile image until domain startup (it will be created
then anyway)
- reset cache only when really changed anything
- attach VM to the volume (snapshot) created for its runtime - to not
expose changes (for example in root volume) to child VMs until
shutdown
QubesOS/qubes-issues#2412QubesOS/qubes-issues#2256
The wrapper doesn't do anything else than translating command
parameters, but it's load time is significant (because of python imports
mostly). Since we can't use python lvm API from non-root user anyway,
lets drop the wrapper and call `lvm` directly (or through sudo when
necessary).
This makes VM startup much faster - storage preparation is down from
over 10s to about 3s.
QubesOS/qubes-issues#2256
...instead of manual copy in python. DD is much faster and when used
with `conv=sparse` it will correctly preserve sparse image.
QubesOS/qubes-issues#2256
Set parameters for possibly hiding domain's real IP before attaching
network to it, otherwise we'll have race condition with vif-route-qubes
script.
QubesOS/qubes-issues#1143
This is the IP known to the domain itself and downstream domains. It may
be a different one than seen be its upstream domain.
Related to QubesOS/qubes-issues#1143`
This helps hiding VM IP for anonymous VMs (Whonix) even when some
application leak it. VM will know only some fake IP, which should be set
to something as common as possible.
The feature is mostly implemented at (Proxy)VM side using NAT in
separate network namespace. Core here is only passing arguments to it.
It is designed the way that multiple VMs can use the same IP and still
do not interfere with each other. Even more: it is possible to address
each of them (using their "native" IP), even when multiple of them share
the same "fake" IP.
Original approach (marmarek/old-qubes-core-admin#2) used network script
arguments by appending them to script name, but libxl in Xen >= 4.6
fixed that side effect and it isn't possible anymore. So use QubesDB
instead.
From user POV, this adds 3 "features":
- net/fake-ip - IP address visible in the VM
- net/fake-gateway - default gateway in the VM
- net/fake-netmask - network mask
The feature is enabled if net/fake-ip is set (to some IP address) and is
different than VM native IP. All of those "features" can be set on
template, to affect all of VMs.
Firewall rules etc in (Proxy)VM should still be applied to VM "native"
IP.
FixesQubesOS/qubes-issues#1143
